Proving Discrimination After Croson and
Adarand: "If It Walks Like a Duck"
By DEREK M.
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GOVERNMENTAL DISCRIMINATION in favor of awarding public
contracts to majority white-owned firms may be merely a lingering
practice in some jurisdictions. However, the underutilization of minority-owned firms, as a result of overt and covert disparate treatment
by majority white contractors in the private sector, remains a present
day reality. Thirty years of government-sponsored affirmative action
designed to remedy the effects of racial and gender discrimination
against minority and female-owned businesses in the public sector has
reached a plateau. The Supreme Court's application of strict scrutiny
to race-based affirmative action programs at the state and local levels
has had cataclysmic effects. Many state and local jurisdictions re-enacted affirmative action programs following the Supreme Court's decision in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.I In Croson, the Court
invalidated the City of Richmond's minority and female-owned business program, where it found the program to be in violation of the
* B.A., Morehouse College, 1975; J.D., University of California at Los Angeles, 1981.
Visiting Professor, University of the District of Columbia, David A. Clarke School of Law.
The author also served as special counsel to the City of Atlanta in 1991, where he
conducted public hearings on discrimination in the Atlanta business market before the
Atlanta City Council. He has also served as a consultant to other jurisdictions. The author
wishes to thank Professor Michael Lewyn for his encouragement, editorial comments, and
fellowship; Professor J. Vincent Eagan for his invaluable assistance in various ways;
Professors Clark Cunningham and Robert D'Agostino for their readings of his earlier
drafts; and Kathy Richardson and Henrietta Lindsay for their hard work in typing his many
drafts. Lastly, the author owes his gratitude to his loving wife, Laura, for her
encouragement and support. The author wishes to dedicate this article to the late Maynard
H. Jackson, former three-term mayor of Atlanta who pioneered the very first affirmative
action programs. Part of the title for this article comes from Jackson's testimony before the
Atlanta City Council in 1991, when he said that discrimination can be found "if it walks like
a duck."
1. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). Justice O'Connor authored the majority opinion in Croson.
There were two plurality opinions-Rehnquist, C.J. and White, J. joined O'Connor, J.'s
plurality opinion in Part II, and Rehnquist, CJ., White, J., and Kennedy, J. joined Parts Ill
A and V.
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Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
2
States Constitution.
In a six to three majority decision, the Croson Court ruled that
state or local governments, which set aside a portion of public contract dollars exclusively for minority-owned firms, must be able to
meet a strict scrutiny standard of review. 3 In Croson, the Court concluded that the City of Richmond had presented no evidence of racial
4
discrimination on the part of the city or the city's prime contractors.
In setting forth the proper standard of review to be applied in such
cases, the Court explained, "If the city of Richmond had evidence
before it that nonminority contractors were systematically excluding
minority businesses from subcontracting opportunities, it could take
action to end the discriminatory exclusion." 5 A plural ity of the Court
in Croson recognized that a "state or local subdivision .. .has the au-

thority to eradicate the effects of private discrimination within its own
legislative jurisdiction. 6
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Croson, "state and local governments have scaled back or eliminated altogether affirmative
action programs that had been adopted precisely to overcome discriminatory barriers" to minority participation. 7 Although many jurisdictions re-enancted minority business enterprise ("MBE")" programs
after conducting post-Croson disparity studies of discrimination within
their jurisdictions, there has been a tidal wave of litigation regarding
the issue of government-sponsored MBE programs.
The first prong of the Croson standard requires jurisdictions to
show that there is a "strong basis in evidence" that discrimination exists.9 Despite their conducting of extensive studies that have shown
See Croson, 488 U.S. at 505-06.
See id. at 493.
See id.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 491-92.
See Brent Simmons, Reconsidering Strict Scrutiny of Affirmative Action, 2 Mici.
J. RACE & L. 51, 56 (1996); see also Docia Rudley & Donna Hubbard, What a Difference a
Decade Makes:Judicial Response to State and Local Minority Business Set-Asides Ten Years
After City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson, 25 S. ILL. U. LJ. 39, 42 n.18 (2000). "Some jurisdictions abandoned the effort altogether because of the high expense associated with conducting disparity studies. Other jurisdictions altered their programs by adopting less
intrusive race-neutral alternatives, such as relaxation of bonding requirements, providing
access to financing, and simplifying bidding procedures." Id. at 93.
8. "MBE" shares a meaning similar to the terms "SDB" and "DBE," which will be
introduced infra. The three terms will be used interchangeably.
9. See, e.g., George R. La Noue, The Impact of Croson on Equal ProtectionLaw and Policy,
61 ALB. L. REv. 1, 23 (1997).
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
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the existence of disparities in public sector contracting, most jurisdictions have been unable to withstand judicial scrutiny under this first
prong of the Croson standard.1 0 Strict scrutiny requires a showing that
there is a strong basis in evidence of either active participation by the
government in prior discrimination or passive participation by the
government in discrimination that has been fostered by the local industry affected by the MBE program at issue.'" Since only a few jurisdictions have been able to demonstrate the requisite showing, strict
scrutiny has been fatal to many MBE programs.
Reliance on a showing of the effects of public discrimination has
been fruitless for local jurisdictions. Local governments, however, may
be able to take remedial action when they can show that their own
spending practices were or are exacerbating a pattern of private discrimination. Despite the ruling in Croson, the Supreme Court has not
offered clear guidance as to what constitutes proof of such government-fostered private discrimination. As several commentators have
observed, "Croson ... did not fully explain what types of private dis2
crimination are remediable."'
Not only was there a lack of guidance set forth by the Court as to
what constitutes private discrimination, but there was also little guidance offered regarding what is needed to prove public discrimination. As one writer observed, "The cases which follow Croson reflect
the confusion on the part of both the courts and the local and municipal governments as to what amount of statistics, written testimony, and
historical evidence is needed to satisfy the negative standard of
10. See id. at 34 (noting that in the first three years immediately following Croson,
there was very little impact; thereafter, there were successful challenges to MBE programs,
and since then, litigation has affected many more programs).
11. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 502. Affirmative action programs designed to assist femaleowned businesses raise the issue of whether such programs serve important governmental
interests, rather than whether they meet the strict scrutiny standard. In this context, something less than a "strong basis in evidence" showing is required. The Supreme Court has
not sufficiently addressed this issue. Although, some lower courts have required jurisdictions to present probative evidence of discrimination against females to justify their gender-based programs. See Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990, 1010
(3d Cir. 1993).
12. Ian Ayers & Fredrick E. Vars, When Does PrivateDiscriminationJustify Affirmative Action?, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1577, 1584 (1998). The authors noted that societal discrimination
does not create a factual predicate of discrimination on its own. The authors first attacked
the idea that government-sponsored affirmative action can only be used to remedy government-perpetrated discrimination. The authors sought to establish a theory of proving private discrimination, in order to create a narrowly tailored affirmative action program, by
offering three broad possible types ofjustifications: "causal," "but for," and "single market."
See id. at 1584-87. See also discussion infra Part III.
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Croson."' 3 Circuit courts, the writer also noted, have demonstrated a
"tendency towards feeling their way around the matter, like the blind
lady of justice herself." 14 Most jurisdictions that have enacted postCroson programs have relied on disparity studies to demonstrate the
existence of public discrimination-and most of these jurisdictions
have failed to meet the required showing of discrimination. MBE programs in Atlanta, Columbus, Philadelphia, Miami, Cleveland, San
Francisco, Houston, and Chicago, to name a few have failed to make
the requisite showing of the existence of discrimination, or of the effects of past discrimination, in their respective localities.
The present day reality is that Croson and its application have
been strict in theory and fatal in fact, despite justice O'Connor's pronouncement in Croson that governments have the power to address
the effects of racial discrimination. 15 However, federal courts have
been less hostile towards federal affirmative action programs, as compared to local programs, having frequently found that the federal government has met the strict scrutiny standard. Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena'6 and its sojourn through the appellate courts demonstrated
the level of past effects of public and private marketplace discrimination required for the federal government to be able to hurdle the
strict scrutiny standard of Croson.
For example, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater,17 the Tenth
Circuit found that the United States Department of Transportation's
("DOT") Disadvantaged Business Enterprise ("DBE") Program was
narrowly tailored and, therefore, constitutional.' The DBE program
involved the DOT's use of race-based presumptions in awarding federal funds to state and local government transportation programs.' 9
13. Nicole Duncan, Croson Revisited: A Legacy of Uncertainty in the Application of
Strict Scrutiny, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 679, 684 (1995).
14. Id. at 680. See also Rudley & Hubbard, supranote 7, at 43 (noting that a number of
questions were left open after Croson and, for many state and local governments, strict
scrutiny has remained an amorphous concept).
15. Croson, 488 U.S. at 486-92.
16. 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (hereinafter Adarand III].
17. 228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Adarand VII]. Appellant Adarand appealed the Tenth Circuit decision, asserting that the court of appeals misapplied the strict
scrutiny standard and that the federal program was not narrowly tailored. The Supreme
Court originally granted certiorari, but after oral argument, the Supreme Court dismissed
the granting of certiorari as being "improvidently granted." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001). The case has had a nine year history, beginning with Adarand
Constructors v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp. 240 (D. Colo. 1992) [hereinafter Adarand I]. See
discussion infra Part II.
18. See Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1187.
19. See id. at 1156.
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A few federal courts have held similarly with respect to the federal
government's showing of discrimination regarding MBE programs
that are designed to assist disadvantaged minority and female enterprises. In such cases, courts have afforded greater deference to Congress, as compared to local governments and agencies, regarding
Congress' authority to identify and address racial discrimination.
These courts have found that the necessary factual predicate was met
by Congress, and so have concluded that Congress' granting of remedial relief was legitimate in these instances. Hence, the question has
arisen: why have local jurisdictions been unable to meet Croson's strict
scrutiny standard, where the same constitutional standard of equal
20
protection is to be applied to both federal and local governments?
This article will address the problems local jurisdictions face in
attempting to meet the showing of proof of discrimination required
under the Croson strict scrutiny standard. Part I of this article will address the Supreme Court's opinion in the Croson case and the attempts by state and local jurisdictions to meet the strict scrutiny
standard. An analysis of lower federal court opinions will show the
lack of standards set forth by courts regarding what is required of jurisdictions for them to be able to show that a strong basis in evidence
of discrimination exists to warrant a race-based remedy. Part II of this
article will focus on the application of strict scrutiny to the federal
government's demonstration of proof of discrimination under the requirements of Adarand VII. Part III will address the absence of a concrete model of proof for jurisdictions and courts to rely upon
regarding the "strong basis in evidence" standard. It will also review
the attempts made by local jurisdictions to demonstrate private sector
discrimination within their own jurisdictions, as permitted by Croson.
The major conclusions of this article will demonstrate that the Croson
strict scrutiny standard has been an impossible burden for local governments to meet, regarding their ability to prove the existence of
public sector discrimination against minority and female-owned businesses. The only viable and effective way for local governments to
meet Croson's strict scrutiny standard is for them to show that they
have passively participated in demonstrated private sector discrimination. Race and gender discrimination continues to permeate the busi20. The Court in Adarand III, in fact, squarely answered the question of whether different constitutional standards apply to state and federal governments. The Court in
Adarand III held that "all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny." Adarand
III, 515 U. S. at 227. See discussion infra Part II.
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ness and construction markets, and local jurisdictions, as well as the
federal government, should not be powerless to act to eradicate it.
I.

Croson and the Application of Strict Scrutiny of RaceBased Business Programs

In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., the Supreme Court established the principle that racial classifications used by state or local governments, whether for invidious purposes or in the form of benign
affirmative action plans, are governed by the Equal Protection Clause
and are subject to strict judicial scrutiny. 2 1 In a six to three majority
decision, the Croson Court held that state and local programs which
allocate or set aside a portion of public contracting dollars to MBEs
must be able to meet this standard of review. 22 justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, stated that the "standard of review under the
Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification." 23 For the first time,
a majority of the Supreme Court resolved the issue of the appropriate
standard of review for courts to use regarding government-sponsored
24
affirmative action programs.
The strict scrutiny or "color-blind" approach to adjudging the
constitutionality of race-based affirmative action programs requires a
showing of a compelling governmental interest by the state or locality
attempting to institute such a program. Additionally, the approach
mandates that the programs be narrowly tailored to achieve the juris25
dictions' asserted governmental interests.
This watershed case spurred a national debate on the future of
affirmative action at local levels and the obligation upon local governments to meet the heightened standard of strict scrutiny. While the
Court did not disavow the use of race-conscious remedies to address
the problem of racial discrimination, Croson nonetheless marked a
21. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
22. See id.
23.
Id. at 494 (relying on holding in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
279-80 (1986)).
24. In Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990), the Court upheld the
use of an intermediate standard of review regarding federal programs that involved the use
of race-based classifications. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S.

265 (1978), the Court left unresolved the proper level of scrutiny, strict or intermediate, to
be applied to race-based classifications. See generally Simmons, supra note 7 (critiquing recent Supreme Court rulings applying strict scrutiny as the proper standard for affirmative
action programs).
25. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 484; see also Darlene C. Goring, Private Problem, Public
Solution: Affirmative Action in the 21st Century, 33 AKRON L. REV. 209, 242 (2000).

Summer 2003]

PROVING DISCRIMINATION

change in the Court's willingness to treat racial classifications differently than other types of classifications.
A.

Compelling Governmental Interest

In Croson, the Court struck down the City of Richmond's minority
set-aside program because the city had failed to provide the adequate
evidentiary showing of past and present discrimination needed to
demonstrate a compelling governmental interest under strict scrutiny.26 The Richmond program at issue required majority contractors
seeking to do business with Richmond to submit minority business
utilization plans. Within these plans, majority contractors had to show
that at least thirty percent of their contract dollars, for a particular
project, would be awarded to MBEs. 27 Croson, a majority-owned
mechanical plumbing and heating contractor, submitted a bid for the
installation of urinals and water faucets for the city jail that did not
include the required minority utilization plan. 28 Although Croson had
solicited MBEs for their involvement in its project, Croson ultimately
requested a waiver from the city's program and submitted a bid that
did not include MBE-participation information because the costs of
subcontracting MBEs would have increased the overall cost of
Croson's bid. 29 Richmond rejected Croson's bid and refused to grant
30
a waiver to Croson.
Thereafter, Croson brought an action against the city, arguing
that the Richmond plan was unconstitutional."1 The district court upheld the plan, as did the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying a
deferential standard of review.32 The Fourth Circuit determined that
national findings of discrimination in the construction industry, in
conjunction with the statistical study offered by the city that showed
that low numbers of minority participants in contracting were the result of discrimination, served as a reasonable basis for the city's reme26. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 505.
27. The City of Richmond's Minority Business Plan included the following languarge:
"To justify a waiver, it must be shown that every feasible attempt has been made to comply,
and it must be demonstrated that sufficient, relevant, qualified Minority Business Enterprises ... are unavailable or unwilling to participate in the contract to enable meeting the
30% MBE goal." Id. at 478-79 (quotingJ.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 779 F.2d 181,
197 (4th Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Croson 1]).
28. See Croson at 481-82.
29. See id. at 482-83
30.

See id.

31.
32.

See id. at 483.
See Croson I, 779 F.2d at 190.
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dial efforts .3 The court then considered whether the program was
narrowly tailored, focusing on the numerical racial quota used by the
city and the quota's correlation to the discrimination the city sought
to alleviate.3 4 The court of appeals analyzed the thirty percent "setaside" not in relation to the number of MBEs in Richmond, but to the
percentage of minority persons in the city's population. 35 The court
of appeals upheld the thirty percent figure, finding that it was "reasonable in light of the undisputed fact that minorities constitute 50% of
3' 6
the population of Richmond. 1
On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the
Fourth Circuit in light of the Court's plurality decision in Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education.3 7 On remand, a divided Fourth Circuit
court found Richmond's program unconstitutional, holding that
proof of societal discrimination did not provide justification for the
city's program. 8 Relying on Wygant, the Fourth Circuit court concluded that Richmond was required to demonstrate "prior discrimination by the government unit involved."'39 According to the court of
appeals, a debate that followed a Richmond City Council meeting "revealed no record of prior discrimination by the city in awarding public
contracts, aside from some conclusory and highly general statements
made by a member of the public."4° Even if the city had demonstrated
a compelling interest for the use of the race-based "quota," the court
concluded that the thirty percent set aside was not narrowly tailored
to accomplish the city's asserted remedial purpose. 41 Richmond appealed the Fourth Circuit's ruling.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 192.
35. See id. at 190.
36. Id.
37. SeeJ.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986) (citing Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986)). In Wygant, white teachers challenged an affirmative action policy adopted by the local school board and a teachers' union, which provided a limited form of protection to minority teachers in the event of a lay off. See Wygant,
476 U.S. at 269-70. The policy provided that in the event of a layoff, minority teachers
would not be laid off less than their percentage of minority personnel employed. See id. A
four person plurality of the Court found that the program violated the Equal Protection
Clause because the board and the union had failed to first show "prior discrimination by
the governmental unit involved." See id. at 274.
38. J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 1358 (4th Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Croson II].
39. Id. (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274).
40. Croson Ii, 822 F.2d at 1358. The court of appeals in Croson II found that the core
of the holding of the Supreme Court's opinion in Wygant requires jurisdictions to show
that their plans are justified by a compelling governmental interest. See id. at 1357.
41. See id. at 1358.
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Relying on an approach similar to that used by the Supreme
Court plurality in Wygant, Croson. argued that Richmond or anybody
wishing to employ any race-based remedy must be limited to "eradicating the effects of its own prior discrimination. '42 Richmond, on the
other hand, argued that the city had the authority to "define and attack the effects of prior discrimination in its local construction industry."4 " The resolution of this case, defining the extent to which a local
jurisdiction may take action to eradicate discriminatory conduct
within its own jurisdiction, had far-reaching implications for the future of affirmative action plans. As will be discussed infra, whether
plans were developed based on proof of discrimination by the government entity itself or.proof of private marketplace-fostered discrimination would determine the legitimacy and ultimate constitutionality of
the remedy itself.
In its Croson opinion, the Supreme Court initially addressed the
question of the scope of the city's power to adopt legislation to address the effects of past discrimination. 44 According to the Court, empowering states to have equal- authority with Congress would insulate
any social classifications from judicial scrutiny under Section One of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 5 In disagreeing with Justice Marshall's
dissent, the Croson majority pointed out that it did not view Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment as a form of "federal pre-emption
in matters of race." 4 6 Accordingly, the Court asserted that state and

local jurisdictions were not powerless to act to remedy the effects of
47
past discrimination.
The Court next gave its final approval regarding a local jurisdiction's authority to legislate to eradicate private discrimination. The
Court stated, "It would seem ...

clear ...

that a state or local subdivi-

sion. . . has the authority to eradicate the effects of private discrimination within its own legislative jurisdiction. '48 The Court distinguished
Croson from Wygant, which had held that the Equal Protection Clause
requires some showing of prior discrimination by the government
unit involved. 49 In Croson,Justice O'Connor asserted:
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 486 (1989).
Id.
See id.
See id. at 490.
Id. at 491.
See id.
Id. at 491-92.
See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. at 267, 274 (1986).
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[T] he Wygant plurality indicated that the Equal Protection Clause
required "some showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved.". . . To ihis extent, on the question of the city's
competence, the Court of Appeals erred in following Wygant by
rote in a case involving a state entity which has state-law authority
to address discriminatory
practices within local, commerce under
5
its jurisdiction. 0
O'Connor further provided that,
[I]f the city could show that it had essentially become a "passive
participant" in a system of racial exclusion practiced by elements of
the local construction industry, we think it clear that the city could
take affirmative steps to dismantle such a system. It is beyond dispute that any public entity, state or federal, has a compelling interest in assuring that public dollars, drawn from the tax
contributions of
all citizens, do not serve to finance the evil of pri5
vate prejudice. '
Passive participation by a local government in private discriminatory conduct thus provides a constitutional basis for a government to
address that discrimination. As will be discussed in Part III, infra, several jurisdictions, after having failed to demonstrate discrimination by
the government unit itself, have begun to focus on the passive-participation theory of discrimination. 5 2 Nonetheless, many federal circuit
courts continue to insist that governmental units can only use affirma53
tive action to remedy their own active acts of discrimination.
The Court in Croson next applied strict scrutiny as a basis for evaluating Richmond's MBE program. 54 After noting that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees and protects rights that are personal, the
Court stated that "the Richmond Plan denies certain citizens the opportunity to compete for a fixed percentage of public contracts based
50. Croson, 488 U.S. at 492.
51. Id. at 492. A plurality of the Court concluded that the state and local subdivisions
had a compelling interest in remedying identified discrimination, past and present. See also
Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1519 (10th Cir.
1994) (explaining that the Court in Croson had confirmed that the Fourteenth Amendment permits race-conscious relief aimed at eradicating discriminatory conduct and prevents the government from being a passive participant in such conduct).
52. See generally Ayers & Vars, supra note 12 (discussing the different theories a jurisdiction may use to demonstrate that it has been a passive participant in carrying out discrimination within its borders).
53. Id. Authors Ayers and Vars noted that if affirmative action programs are to pass
constitutional muster in the future, it will be because of proof of underutilization of MBEs
in private markets: "Thus, our focus on private discrimination is not just a nice question of
law-it is likely to become the critical question in deciding the future of the federal government's 10 billion dollar race-conscious procurement programs." Id. at 1584.
54. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
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solely upon their race." 55 For the first time, the Court elevated the
equal protection concept of protecting discrete and insular minorities
to protecting the. rights of individuals, regardless of whether they are
considered a discrete and insular minority. Justice O'Connor stated:
"Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such racebased measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial
politics.

'5 6

The Court was concerned that the "political majority [in Richmond] may have acted to disadvantage a minority based on unwarranted assumptions."5 7 Based on this concern, the Court determined
that there was a need for "heightened judicial scrutiny in this case,"
and that equal protection concerns were equally applicable to all individuals. 58 As will be demonstrated, and indeed as the Court later indicated in Adarand III, all racial classifications, whether set forth for
affirmative action purposes or based on invidious discrimination,
59
carry a presumption of illegitimacy.
In defending its program, Richmond relied on proof it had gathered regarding discrimination against black contractors in the construction industry, which had been and was currently being carried
out by national, state, and local actors and entities. 60 It chiefly relied
on evidence regarding the disparity of blacks in the construction industry as compared to the number of blacks in the general population. 6 1 The Court noted that, while the "factfinding process of
legislative bodies is generally entitled to a presumption of regularity
and deferential review by the judiciary,"6 2 when the city uses a suspect
classification, "it cannot rest upon a generalized assertion as to the
'63
classification's relevance to its goals.
The Court asserted that the City's "f[r] eliance on the disparity between the number of prime contracts awarded to minority firms and
64
the minority population of the City of Richmond is ... misplaced."
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 473.
See id. at 496.
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 [Adarand III].
See Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-99.
See id.
Id. at 500.
Id.
Id.
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The Court recognized that "statistical comparisons of the racial composition of an employer's work force to the racial composition of the
relevant population may be probative of a pattern of discrimination.'6 5 However, the Court cautioned that "where special qualifications are necessary, .the relevant statistical pool for purposes of
demonstrating discriminatory exclusion must be the number of mi66
norities qualified to undertake the particular task."
The Court explicitly noted that the disparate impact model, used
in reviewing Title VII employment discrimination cases, would be an
appropriate model for courts to use to determine whether sufficient
statistical proof of discrimination has been presented. 6 7 "There is no
doubt that 'where gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone
may constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination under Title VII.' ,,68 However, where special qualifications are
concerned, the Court noted that comparisons "to the general popula69
tion . . . may have little probative value.."
According to the Court, Richmond had not presented any evidence regarding the number of "MBE's in the relevant market . . .
qualified to undertake prime or subcontracting work in public construction projects. '' 71 Nor, the Court pointed out, did the city know
"what percentage of total city construction dollars minority firms now
' 71
[received] as subcontractors on prime contracts let by the City.
The Court further noted that Richmond's "[setting aside] of subcontracting dollars seem[ed] to rest on the unsupported assumption
that white prime contractors simply [would] not hire minority
firms. '72 As the lower courts have demonstrated since Croson, such assumptions would not be able to withstand judicial scrutiny regarding
any type of racial classifications in the construction industry. Additionally, evidence of a lack of MBE membership in local contractors' associations, standing alone, would not be probative of discrimination
in the local construction industry. 73 The Court stated that for such
evidence to be relevant, the city would have to link the evidence "to
65. Id.
66. Id. at 501 (citing Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308
(1977) and Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 651-652 (1987)).
67. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 501.
68. Id. at 501 (quoting Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307-08).
69. Croson, 488 U.S. at 501 (quoting Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308).
70. Croson, 488 U.S. at 502.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 471 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). Although this was part of the plurality opinion, a majority of the justices accepted private discrimination as a constitution-
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the number of MBE's eligible for membership. ' 74 An inference of discriminatory exclusion could arise if there was a statistical disparity between eligible MBEs and MBE membership in trade associations. In
such a case, the Court noted that "the city would have a compelling
interest in preventing its tax dollars from assisting these organizations
75
in maintaining a racially segregated construction market.
Justice O'Connor's opinion provided support for the proposition
that state and localities may take action to remedy private discrimination "when they possess evidence that their own spending practices
are exacerbating a pattern of prior discrimination." 76 She explained,
however, that when jurisdictions are acting along these lines, "they
must identify that discrimination, public and private, with some specif77
ity before they may use race conscious relief."
The Court concluded that none of the evidence presented by the
City pointed to the existence of discrimination against blacks in the
construction industry. 78 Reliance on societal discrimination alone as
the basis for the contracting program, according to the Court, would
"open the door to competing claims for 'remedial relief' for every disadvantaged group. 7 9' The Court held that the city had failed to
demonstrate a compelling interest in apportioning contract opportunities on the basis of race.8 0
Moreover, the Court asserted, there was "absolutely no evidence of
past-discrimination against Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo or Aleut persons in any aspect of the Richmond construction
ally sufficient rationale for creating an MBP. See also Ayers & Vars, supra note 12 at 1641
n.ll.

74.

See Croson, 488 U.S. at 505.

75. Id. at 503 (citing Ohio Contractors Ass'n v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167, 171 (6th Cir.
1983), where the court upheld a district court's finding that the State of Ohio had become
"'a joint participant' with private industry and certain craft unions in a pattern of racially
discriminatory conduct which excluded black laborers from work on public construction
projects"). In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), the Court upheld a federal public
works program which set aside ten percent of federal monies to be used by states and

localities in procuring services or supplies from certain identified minority groups. See id. at
491-92. In upholding the federal program under an intermediate standard of review, the
Court noted that Congress had an abundant historical basis from which it could have concluded that traditional practices, when applied to minority businesses, could perpetuate
the effects of prior discrimination. See id. at 478. Congress had presented evidence of a
nationwide history of past discrimination that had reduced minority participation in federal contracts. See id. at 458-67.
76. Croson, 488 U.S. at 504.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 505.
79. Id.
80. See id.
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industry."8 ' That the district court tookjudicial notice of the fact that
most minorities in Richmond were black did not obviate the need for
the city to identify the groups who had actually been victims of discrimination. 2 The Court speculated that the city's random inclusion
of such groups, who may have never suffered from discrimination in
the construction industry, could suggest that the city's actual purpose
in enacting its MBE program was not to remedy discrimination. 83 This
apparent "gross over-inclusiveness" raised a concern that the city's
claim of remedial motivation was pretextual, rather than actual.8 4
B.

Narrowly Tailoring

With regard to the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, the
Court held that the Richmond's program was not narrowly tailored to
redress the effects of identified discrimination.885 First, the Court
noted that nothing in the record indicated any consideration on the
part of the city, when it created the program, of using race-neutral
means instead of race-based classifications to increase minority business participation in city contracting.8 6 The Court noted that many of
the barriers to minority participation in the construction industry evidenced in this particular case appeared to have been "race-neutral,"
such as minorities' being unable to meet bonding requirements or to
gain access to capital.8 7 According to the Court, "If MBE's disproportionately lack capital or cannot meet bonding requirements, a raceneutral program would ... lead to greater minority participation. '88
The Court also criticized Richmond's adherence to a rigid number quota, which was unrelated to any identified discrimination.8 9 The
city had not inquired into whether or not the particular MBE seeking
a racial preference "ha [d] suffered from the effects of past discrimination by the city or prime contractors." 9' 0 Despite the City of Richmond's failure to identify specific discrimination or to consider raceneutral programs prior to adopting race-based remedies, the Court
concluded that the City of Richmond was not prohibited from taking
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 506.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 508.
See id. at 507.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 508.
Id.

PROVING DISCRIMINATION

Summer 2003]

action to rectify the effects of identified discrimination within its jurisdiction. 9 1 O'Connor stated:
Nothing we say today precludes a state or local entity from taking
action to rectify the effects of identified discrimination within its
jurisdiction. If the city of Richmond had evidence before it that
nonminority contractors were systematically excluding minority
businesses from subcontracting opportunities, it could take action
to end the discriminatory exclusion. Where there is a significant
statistical disparity between the number of qualified minority contractors willing and able to perform a particular service. and the
number of such contractors actually engaged by the locality or the
locality's prime contractors, an inference of discriminatory exclusion could arise .... Under such circumstances, the city could act

to dismantle the closed business system by taking appropriate measures against those who discriminate on the basis of race or other
illegitimate criteria .

.

...In the extreme case, some form of nar-

be necessary to break down
rowly tailored racial preference might
92
patterns of deliverable exclusion.
Because Richmond had failed to identify the need for remedial
action, its MBE program was found to be in violation of the Equal
93
Protection Clause.
Justice Marshall's dissent in Croson, which was joined by Justices
Brennan and Blackmun, is noteworthy in many respects. Justice Marshall believed that the city had a compelling interest in remedying
past discrimination and had demonstrated such necessity-based evidence, which was "'strong,' 'firm' and 'unquestionably legitimate,"' to
support its program. 94 Importantly, he also felt that Richmond had a
second compelling interest in "preventing the city's own spending decisions from reinforcing and perpetrating the exclusionary effects of
past discrimination. '95 Justice Marshall. wrote:
When government channels all its contracting funds to a whitedominated community of established contractors whose racial homogeneity is the product of private discrimination, it does more
than place its imprimaturon the practices which forged and which
continue to define that community.... In my view, the interest in
ensuring that the government does not reflect and reinforce prior
private discrimination in dispensing public contracts is every9 6bit as
strong as the interest in eliminating private discrimination.
91. See id. at 509.
92. Id. at 509 (citations omitted).
93. See id. at 511.
94. Id. at 540 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 537.
96. Id. at 538. Justice Marshall also disagreed with the "majority's dismissal of the congressional and Executive Branch findings in Fullilove as having 'extremely limited' probative value in this case." Croson, 488 U.S. at 546. Marshall believed that the majority's

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO lAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

Justice Marshall's focus on local government's spending to effectively reinforce private marketplace discrimination remains a viable
focus after Croson, with regard to court determinations on whether a
jurisdiction's program serves a compelling governmental interest.
Marshall believed that evidence that only 0.67% of public construction dollars had gone to minority-owned prime contractors in Richmond, coupled with descriptive testimony from Richmond's elected
and appointed leaders regarding discrimination in the city, established the link necessary for the city to be able to prove that discrimi97
nating practices had taken place.
Following Croson, remedying the effects of past discrimination
carried out by a governmental body itself, or by the private market,
has become a compelling governmental interest sufficient to justify
affirmative race-based classifications in public procurement. The
Croson Court maintained that a jurisdiction may attempt to show that
certain past effects of discrimination amount to identified discrimination, which jurisdictions may remedy.9 8 However, the Court asserted
that it might be inappropriate for that jurisdiction to use direct evidence of societal discrimination or misplaced statistical comparisons
of the number of minorities in the construction business to the general population to make that showing.9 9 Unfortunately, the Court did
not formulate a clear framework for courts to follow when they are
determining whether a government has made a sufficient showing regarding the discriminatory effects alleged to exist or have existed in
the public or private workplace in question. Notwithstanding Croson,
many federal circuits insist that governmental units can only use affirmative action to remedy public discrimination that it has, itself,
perpetrated. I'"
decision "would require cities seeking to eradicate the effects of past discrimination within
their borders to . . . engage in unnecessarily duplicative, costly, and time-consuming
factfinding." Id. at 750. He continued, "No principle of federalism or federal power, however, forbids a state or local government to draw upon a nationally relevant historical record prepared by the Federal Government." Id. at 547 (citations omitted).
97. See id. at 540. As will be demonstrated infra, in Part IIl, the Court has engaged in
less-than-rigorous scrutiny of congressional findings with respect to identifiable discrimination under Croson-the body of evidence necessary to justify congressional action has been
different from that required of local and state governments.
98. See id. at 501.
99. See id.
100. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors v. City & County of Columbus, 936 F. Supp.
1363 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (holding that the City of Columbus had failed to establish a strong
basis in evidence of the existence of past discrimination that had carried out by the city).
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One commentator observed, "[At' least] ten federal circuit and
district courts ... have favorably quoted the Wygant language limiting
race-conscious remedies to the 'government unit involved."1 0 1 One
of these federal courts has remarked, "Although Croson places the burden of production on the municipality to demonstrate a 'strong basis
in evidence' . . . the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a court

to make an ultimate judicial finding of discrimination before a municipality may take affirmative steps to eradicate discrimination."' 102 However, other courts have made it clear that, in their view, public
jurisdictions need not show proof of actual discrimination under
Croson.10 1
C.

Local Jurisdictions' Attempts to Satisfy Croson

How can a jurisdiction show that a strong basis in evidence of
discrimination against minority contractors exists or existed so that
the jurisdiction may justify its implementation of a race-based remedial business program? The Court has not established any significant
model upon which a factual predicate of discriminatory practices may
be based. Accordingly, many questions remain: What factors are relevant to this analysis? Is the historical treatment of minority contractors
and subcontractors in the public and private marketplace relevant? Is
the existence of barriers to minority business formatio'n in the construction subcontracting industry relevant? Is racial discrimination, regarding minority access to funding, capital, and bonding in a
jurisdiction, relevant to the inquiry, if findings of such conduct are
based on localized evidence? The issues involved in these questions,
and the Court's treatment of proof of discrimination in other contexts, such as voting and employment, will be discussed in Part III of
this article.
Ayers & Vars, supra note 12, at 1641 n.17.
102. Concrete Works of Colo. v. City & County of Denver, 36 F.3d at 1522 (10th Cir.
1994) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 292 (1986)).
103. See Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 6. F.3d at 1002 n.10 (3d Cir.
1993), where the court of appeals criticized the district court for interpreting Croson "to
require 'specific evidence of systematic prior discrimination in the industry in question by
th[e] governmental unit' enacting the ordinance" (alteration in original) (citation omitted). This reading, according to the court of appeals, overlooked the "statement in Croson
that a City can be a 'passive participant' in private discrimination by awarding contracts to
firms that practice racial discrimination." Id. (citations omitted); see also Contractors Ass'n
of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 91 F.3d 586, 600 (3d Cir. 1996) ("A city may seek to remedy
discrimination by local trade associations to prevent its passive participation in a system of
private discrimination.").
101.

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

Many jurisdictions, following Croson, have adopted the use of disparity studies to assess the disparity, if any, between the availability and
utilization of minority-owned businesses in government contracting. 0 4 Moreover, lower courts have relied on such disparity studies to evaluate jurisdictions' claims of discrimination to determine
whether such claims warrant race-based remedies. 0 5 Such studies now
number in the hundreds nation-wide, costing jurisdictions hundreds
0
of thousands of dollars.

D.

6

Statistical Quagmire

Although Croson did not hold that any specific type of proof was
required for a city to be able to meet its burden of proof, the Supreme
Court implied that statistical comparisons would be appropriate.1 °7
No court has adopted a precise mathematical formula to assess the
quantum of evidence necessary to establish a strong basis in evidence
sufficient to meet the strict scrutiny standard. Statistical evidence can
give rise to inferences of discrimination if the evidence demonstrates
a significant statistical disparity between the number of qualified and
available minority contractors in a particular locality and the number
of minority contractors or subcontractors engaged by the locality or
the locality's contractor.I" In considering whether such statistical evidence gives rise to circumstantial evidence of discrimination, courts
have generally used a disparity index to measure utilization. 0 9
104. See, e.g., Concrete Works, 36 F.3d 1513.
105. See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 893 F. Supp. 419 (E.D.
Pa. 1995); Eng'g Contractors Ass'n of Fla., Inc. v. Metro. Dade County, 943 F. Supp. 1543
(S.D. Fla. 1996); Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Columbus, 936 F. Supp.
1363 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
106. See La Noue, supra note 9, at 13. La Noue reported 140 such disparity studies,
which employed different analytical and statistical analyses to demonstrate the existence of
discrimination in the public and private marketplace. Several commentators have criticized
the disparity studies as non-objective studies that were designed to be briefs for MBE programs and functioned as insurance policies to discourage litigation involving the
programs.
107. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 501 (1989).
108. See id. at 509 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion); see also Contractors Association, 6
F.3d at 1006.
109. See, e.g., Concrete Works, 36 F.3d at 1524 n.10. The court there explained,
The disparity index is calculated by dividing the percentage of MBE and WBE
participation in city contracts by the percentage of MBEs and WBEs in the relevant population of local construction firms. A disparity index of I demonstrates
full MBE and WBE participation, whereas the closer the index is to zero, the
greater the MBE and WBE underutilization. Some courts multiply the disparity
index by 100, thereby creating a scale between 0 and 100, with 100 representing
full MBE and WBE utilization; ....
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In order to adequately assess statistical evidence, there must be
evidence identifying minority contractors who are ready, willing, and
able to perform the particular jobs at issue. 10 Courts must then determine the relevant statistical pool from which a jurisdiction could
have properly based its statistical comparisons regarding the types of
firms that are being hired for particular jobs."1 ' Determining who is
qualified, willing, and able to perform the particular tasks at issue is
one of the pillars of establishing the factual predicate necessary for
jurisdictions to be able to withstand strict scrutiny." 2 This element is
referred to as "availability."' '3
Following Croson, lower courts have applied different standards,
and have considered numerous variables to determine "availability."
Some courts have relied on census data to determine available contractors, while other courts have used "bidding data" or "vendor
lists."'

"4

Bidding data contains information on the number of minor-

ity and majority firms actually bidding on public contracts,"15 while
vendor lists include the names of firms or companies who have either
pre-qualified, or have simply listed their qualifications, with the jurisdictions in which they do business. 1 6 No consensus has emerged
among legal scholars or lower courts as to the proper yardstick for
courts to use to gauge availability. As one commentator has stated,
"Measuring availability is the key issue in performing a disparity analysis. Despite substantial efforts made by consultants thus far, they have
17
achieved no consensus about this measurement."'
Importantly, the probative force of statistical disparity studies depends upon how the particular studies measure the number of firms
available to compete for the particular locality's contracts. The construction industry has many markets, specialties, and qualifications,
with firms varying in size, capacity, and area of work. For example,
firms that build hospitals orjails are different from companies that lay
See also ContractorsAssociation, 6 F.3d at 1005 ("Disparity indices are highly probative evidence of discrimination because they ensure that the 'relevant statistical pool' of minority
contractors is being considered.").
110. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 509.
111. See id. at 501; see also Eng'g Contractors Ass'n of S. Fla. Inc. v. Metro. Dade County,
122 F.3d 895, 921 (11th Cir. 1997).
112. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 509.
113. See id.
114. See George R. La Noue, Who Counts?: Determining the Availability of Minority Businesses for Public ContractingAfter Croson, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL' 793, 800 (1998).
115. See id. at 832.
116. See id. at 800.
117. Id. at 833.
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asphalt and install plumbing. In other words, regarding the availability
analysis, proper comparisons of firms must be made, in that availability studies should compare like firms to one another, with regards to
qualifications, as well as size and capacity. 118
One of the earlier cases that sought to answer the availability
question was Engineering ContractorsAssociation of South Florida, Inc. v.
Metropolitan Dade County.' '9 There, the district court concluded that

when ajurisdiction relies upon statistical disparities to defend its MBE
program and where special qualifications are a consideration regarding the particular job at issue, the relevant statistical pool must include only those minority firms qualified to provide the requested
services.

1

20

In defending its Black Business Enterprise ("BBE") program,
Dade County relied upon a six-volume, 850-page disparity study, based
on 1982 census data, which compared the proportion of black-owned
construction firms in three standard industry classification ("SIC")
codes to majority-owned firms, with regards to the proportion of overall revenues they received.' 2 1 The case was eventually settled after a
22
three day trial. 1

Dade County's program was later expanded to assist Hispanic and
female-owned businesses.' 23 To justify this expansion, Dade County
conducted a separate disparity study, which- included a regression
analysis to control for firm size.12 4 In a 1994 legal challenge to the
expanded program, the district court concluded that the county's
prime contracting analysis did not create a strong basis in evidence to
justify the Minority and Women Business Enterprises ("MWBE") 125
Program.1 2 6 The court stated:
Every expert economist who testified in this case stated unequivocally that the existence of numerical disparities [does] not lead to
the conclusion that discrimination exists. This is because simple
disparity indices do not account for the myriad factors that can
legitimately result in disparities, such as the availability of MWBEs
that are actually qualified to perform the contract requirements,
118.
119.

See id. at 824.

943 F. Supp. 1546 (S.D. Fla. 1996), affd, 122 F.3d 895 (11 th Cir. 1997) (describing

the history of various challenges to the Dade County Black Business Program).
120. See id. at 1555.
121. See La Noue, supra note 114 at 821.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.

125.

"MWBE" will be used interchangeably with "M/WBE;" "MFBE," and "M/FBE."

126.

See id. at 823.
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[and] the size of [firms], which will impact the dollar value of
27

contracts.1

The district court also noted that the county had not collected or
released data regarding the number of MWBEs that had been utilized
on the county's prime contracts as subcontractors.' 28 Thus, the court
determined that the county's subcontractor availability analysis was
129
flawed.
In a similar case, Associated General Contractorsof America v. City of
Columbus,13 0 the district court found that while the City of Columbus's
disparity study calculated availability by using three different
sources-bidder lists, vendor lists, and telephone surveys-" [n] one of
these measures of availability purported to measure the number of
M/FBE's who were qualified and willing to bid as prime contractors
on city construction projects."' 31 The court also criticized the disparity
study's methodology regarding the statistical analysis used to calculate
subcontractor participation. 132 The court asserted that by combining
prime and subcontractor data, the city was mixing "apples and oranges." 133 According to the court, "A statistical analysis which combines prime and subcontract data prevents a separate analysis of M/
FBE participation in subcontracting. This methodology defies
logic."13 4
Likewise, in Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania Inc. v.
1 35
the district court criticized the city consultant's
City of Philadelphia,
reliance on census data to determine the aggregate number of available minority contractors, where the consultant had not determined
whether qualified, willing, and able black contractors were excluded
from participating in Philadelphia public contracting.' 3 6 According to
the court, "Dr. Brimmer simply assured that every black contractor
127. Eng'g Contractors Ass'n of S. Fla., Inc. v. Metro. Dade County, 943 F. Supp. 1546,
1582 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
128. See La Noue, supra note 114, at 823.
129. See id.
130. 936 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
131. Id. at 1389, rev'd & vacated on other grounds.
132.

See id. at 1386.

133. See id.
134. Id. at 1391. The court concluded that the census figures presented by the city of
Columbus overstated the availability of M/FBEs, and improperly combined prime and subcontracting data. In addition, the court also found that the study did not provide convincing evidence of discrimination against M/FBEs in city construction. See id.
135. 893 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Pa. 1995), affd, 91 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1996).
136. See id. at 432.
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who was available was equally qualified, willing, and able to perform
37
City public works contracts."'
Specifically, the court noted that by simply relying on census data,
which only detailed the number of black-owned construction firms in
the Philadelphia Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, the consultant had failed to take bidding activity or prequalification information
into consideration. 3s Such information, the court asserted, would
have allowed the city to determine which black-owned firms were actually qualified to perform public works projects. 3 9 "Without measuring
the number of contractors actually engaged by the City to perform
particular services, it is impossible to determine whether black firms
were excluded from performing these services."140
The district court accepted the testimony of the plaintiff's expert
witness, who had criticized the methodology of the city's expert, Dr.
Andrew Brimmer.14 Specifically, plaintiff's expert criticized Dr. Brimmer's methodology for the following reasons (among others): 1) it
relied heavily on census data, without considering true availability; 2)
it relied on the city's figures regarding availability without testing
these figures; 3) it assumed that all MBEs who were available were also
qualified to perform certain jobs; and 4) it never made any independent comparison of the number of black to non-black construction
firms in the Philadelphia area who where qualified, willing, and able
42
to perform city contracts.'
The court also noted that the plaintiff's expert had compared Dr.
Brimmer's disparity study to other studies that Brimmer had performed and had concluded that the Philadelphia study was far less
comprehensive than those other studies and was based on evidence
that Dr. Brimmer had rejected previously as statistically
insignificant.

43

137. Id.
138. See id. at 433.
139. See id.
140. Id. The district court concluded that Brimmer's disparity study was unreliable
since it contained many "serious methodological and scientific flaws." Id.
141. See id. at 432.
142. See id. at 431-32. The plaintiff's expert witness was Dr. George R. La Noue. See id.
at 431.
143. See id. at 432. Specifically, Dr. Brimmer had based his conclusion regarding private
sector racial discrimination on survey answers provided by non-MBE contractors, which
had a return rate of 0.32 percent. This rate was far below the fifteen percent return rate
that Dr. Brimmer had rejected as "statistically insignificant" when he had conducted a similar disparity study for Dade County. See id.
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Contractors Association was later appealed to the Third Circuit.
While the appeals court affirmed the district court's holding, the
court of appeals differed with the district court's conclusions and assessment of some of the evidence regarding availability and qualifications of minority contractors. The court determined that, while the
district court was correct in concluding that a statistical assessment
should focus on the minority population capable of performing the
work, "[t]he issue of qualifications can be approached at different
levels of specificity and . . . some consideration of the practicality of
various approaches is required."' 1 44 The court continued, "An analysis

it may theoretically be
is not devoid of probative value simply because
145
possible to adopt a more refined approach."
The court further pointed out that some of the district court's
criticism, regarding the city's statistics on the willingness of firms to
participate in contracting, was problematic.' 46 The court stated, "In
the absence of some reason to believe otherwise, one can normally
assume that participants in a market with the ability to undertake
gainfufl work will be 'willing' to undertake it."' 14 7 Additionally, the

court noted, other factors might account for a firm's unwillingness to
seek work, such as a firm's having encountered discrimination in a
148
particular market in the past.

In reviewing the district court's ultimate conclusion that the City
of Philadelphia had not demonstrated a strong basis in evidence that
discrimination existed in the prime contract market, the court of appeals stated that "[t]he record provide [d] substantially more support
for the proposition that there was discrimination on the basis of race
in the award of prime contracts by the City in the fiscal 1979-1981
period." 149 Defendant's evidence of disparity in the awarding of prime
contracts was represented by a 22.5 on the disparity index, as assessed
by the city's expert. 50 The city's expert found that this disparity was
sufficiently attributable to discrimination against black contractors,
144. Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 91 F.3d 586, 603 (3d Cir. 1996).
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. See id.
149. Id. at 602.
150. Id. See supra note 109 for discussion of the meaning of disparity indices and how
they are calculated. A disparity ratio compares the percentage of contract dollars awarded
to MFBEs to the percentage of available MFBEs in the relevant market. The lower the ratio,
the greater the disparity. The use of disparity indices to examine the utilization of minority
firms has been used by a number of federal courts. See, e.g., Eng'g Contractors Ass'n of S.
Fla. Inc. v. Metro. Dade County, 122 F.3d 895, 913 (11th Cir. 1997).
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and that it, therefore, justified the city's remedial program. 151 The
court of appeals noted that "[t]here are circumstances in which a disparity index of 22.5 can constitute a strong basis in evidence for inferring the existence of discrimination.' ' 5 2 The court continued,
"Whether the record provides a strong basis in evidence for an infer' 53
ence of discrimination in the prime contract market is a close call."'
It was a close call the court declined to make. Instead, the court,
affirming the lower court's holding, reasoned that, even assuming that
the record presented 'an adequately firm basis from which an inference of discrimination could be created, the program was not narrowly tailored.' 5 4 The primary purpose of the city's program was to
provide a market for black subcontractors, within which they could
work on prime contracts awarded by the city.'5 5 However, the city's
evidence of discrimination against black subcontractors was insufficient to support a program that was specifically designed to serve this
purpose. 5 6 In fact, the city's expert presented no evidence to the district court regarding black participation in subcontracting. 5 7 The
court of appeals noted that "strict scrutiny review requires [an examination of] the 'fit' between the identified discrimination and the remedy chosen" by the involved jurisdiction to address this
discrimination.15 8 Since Philadelphia's program focused exclusively

on the subcontracting market, the court of appeals concluded that it
was not narrowly tailored to address discrimination in the prime con59
tracting market. '

As the methods used by different courts and jurisdictions in calculating availability have varied from case to case, courts have suggested that a separate analysis regarding prime 'contractors and
subcontracting is essential.'ll As one commentator has stated, "In calculating availability, one should not conflate two analytically distinct
problems."''
151. See ContractorsAss'n, 91 F.3d at 602.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 605:
154. See id.
155. Id. at 606.
156. See id. at 607.
157. See id. at 606.
158. See id. at 605.
159. See id.
160. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Columbus, 936 F. Supp.
1363, 1391 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
161. See La Noue, supra note 114 at 825.
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The Croson Court did not set forth any specific method for courts
to use in determining the contractors and subcontractors that are
"available, willing and able" to seek public contracts. Hence, a proper
statistical comparison of the firms that are willing and able to perform
a particular task to those firms actually engaged by the involved locality is difficult to perform. The Court has indicated that an inference of
discriminatory exclusion could arise from evidence of a numerical disparity, demonstrated through comparisons of the types of firms receiv62
ing governmental contracts to those being denied such contracts.1
However, a paradigmatic approach, which provides the proper basis
for courts to use in determining whether statistical data on availability
is sufficient to demonstrate a discriminatory exclusion of minority
firms, has yet to be set forth.
In Webster v. Fulton County, Georgia,163 the Eleventh Circuit court
of appeals affirmed the district court's finding that Fulton County had
failed to demonstrate a strong basis in evidence of the existence of
discrimination against black and minority firms, based on statistical
evidence presented in the county's disparity report and its post-disparity report.164 The disparityreport, known as the Brimmer-Marshall Report, consisted of an eight-volume study detailing discrimination
against MWBEs based on historical, statistical, and anecdotal evidence.1 65 The disparity study showed consistently low disparity and
utilization ratios regarding MWBEs. 166 The study found large disparities in public and private contracting opportunities between majority
and minority firms. 16 7 The study noted that minority firms derived
much of their revenue from the public sector. 168 The study primarily
analyzed black and minority firms, using census data derived from six
different SICs, including construction, general contracting, trade con169
tracting, and land development.

After reviewing the study's methodology, the district court found
its data and conclusions insufficient to establish a strong basis in evi162. See City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989) ("Where there is
a significant statistical disparity between the number of qualified minority contractors willing and able to perform a particular service and the number of such contractors actually
engaged by the locality or the locality's prime contractors, an inference of discriminatory
exclusion could arise.").
163. 218 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2000).
164. See id. at 1267, affg51 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (N.D. Ga. 1999).
165. See Webster v. Fulton County, Ga., 51 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1357 (N.D. Ga. 1999).
166. See id. at 1368.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id.
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dence.1 70 The court found "two flaws in the analysis that [were] insurmountable." 171 According to the court, the analysis used in the
Brimmer-Marshall study proceeded on the improper premise that a
statistical showing of underutilization of minorities in the marketplace
as a whole amounted to sufficient proof of discrimination, justifying
racial preference by the local government involved.' 172 The court
found the assumption contrary to Croson's mandate, which disavowed
any reliance by a jurisdiction on societal discrimination in the marketplace. 173 "If a statistical showing of underutilization of minorities in
the marketplace as a whole is sufficient proof of discrimination to justify a program of racial preferences, such a showing as to the United
States as a whole would justify racial preferences by every governing
entity in the United States." 17 4 The court further stated that "statistical
evidence of underutilization of minorities in the general Atlanta marketplace alone does not show discrimination by Fulton County accord75
ing to Croson."1
The district court's focus in that case was on uncovering a showing of discrimination that had been carried out by the government
itself, contrary to Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Croson,
where she rejected the need for such a showing. 176 The court also
found that the Brimmer-Marshall study contained no statistical evidence regarding the utilization of minority subcontractors by prime
contractors doing business with Fulton County. 7 7 This failure, the
court found, resulted in the county's inability to show that its spending practices were exacerbating a pattern of discrimination in the private sector, as required by Croson.'17 The court noted that the county
could rely on a showing of discrimination in the private sector if it
provided a link between the private sector discrimination and the
county's contracting policies. 179 The court also disagreed with the
County's definition of discrimination in the private sector "as meaning any governmental contracting in a marketplace where there is dis170.

See id.

171.

Id.

172.

See id.

173. See id. at 1369.
174. Id.
175. Id.

176.

See id. at 1369-70.

177.

See id. at 1369.

178.
179.

See id.
See id.
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crimination."' 8 0 The court maintained that government contracts with
a firm in a private marketplace where discrimination exists is insufficient to establish that the government itself discriminates. In Webster,
the county had not provided any linkage between its program and
private sector discrimination. 18 1
The district court identified the second flaw in the county's disparity study as a lack of "statistical analysis of other factors that may
affect minority business enterprise availability and utilization."' 18 2 Specifically, the study did not account for race-neutral factors such as firm
size, or the inability of minority firms to obtain financing and bonding. 8 3 By contrast, as the court pointed out, a regression analysis was
used by Dade County in the Engineering Contractorscase to determine
whether the disparities evidenced in that case were due to discrimination. 8 4 The Webster court concluded that, based upon the flaws identified in the county's statistics, the study "fail[ed] to show 'gross
statistical disparities' between the proportion of MBEs hired for
projects or contracts, and the proportion of minorities willing and
185
able to do the work for Fulton County."
The court also criticized the county's reliance on its so-called
"post-enactment evidence," which was set forth in the county's 1994
post-disparity study to justify its 1994 program. 18 6 The county's expert
attempted to use post-enactment evidence regarding Fulton County's
utilization of female and minority contractors in relation to their availability, without relying on the unenlightening census approach. 187 In
doing so, the expert did not consider any data from firms who had
actually bid for contracts with Fulton County.188 Instead, the expert in
that case used bidding data from the city of Atlanta and the Atlanta
school system as a basis for determining availability in Fulton
County. 89 The court criticized this approach and was unwilling to as-

sume that, because of geographic proximity, there was a close approximation between the availability of M/WBEs in the City of Atlanta and
the Atlanta school system and the availability of such firms in Fulton
180. See id. (quoting Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 36 F.3d
1513, 1529 (10th Cir. 1994)).
181. Webster, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 1369.

182.

Id.

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

See id. at 1370.

See id.
Id. (citation omitted).
See id. at 1373.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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County. 191 The court noted that only fifty percent of the minority
firms certified by the City of Atlanta were also certified by Fulton
County and that part of Fulton County was outside the city limits of
Atlanta. 19 1 Therefore, the court found that the county's expert had

improperly analyzed availability in this instance. 192
The court also discounted the county's reliance on availability
measurements that were based on bidding data, stating that reliance
on bidders overstates availability because of the "unavailability of minority firms to bid on and obtain large construction contracts.."193 In
addition, the court further criticized the post-disparity study because
scientific methods were not used to account for disparities that were
the result of factors unrelated to discrimination. 194
The Webster case followed the Engineering Contractors, Contractors
Association, Florida, and Associated General Contractors decisions, where
there had been no uniform view amongst the courts regarding the
proper method to use to measure underutilization and availability of
MWBEs. The disparity studies used by the various jurisdictions involved in these cases did not survive close judicial scrutiny in their
respective district or appellate courts, regarding the statistical measures of disparity they used to attempt to show that there was a strong
basis in evidence of the existence of discriminatory practices. 9 5
Although no precise mathematical formula must be used byjurisdictions, some courts have not been receptive to jurisdictions' use of
census data regarding their availability or utilization analyses. Courts
have gone out of their way to stress that non-discriminatory factors,
such as firm size and lack of capital or bonding capacity, may be used
to explain the underutilization of minority firms. 19 6 For example, the
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. Id. A regression analysis studies the statistical significance of results and describes
the probability that the measured disparity is the result of mere chance. See id. Social scientists consider a finding of two standard deviations significant, meaning "there is about a
one chance in twenty that the explanation for the deviation could be random and the
deviation must be accotnted for by some factor other than chance." Id. at 1373 (quoting
Peightal v. Metro. Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545, 1556 n.16 (11th Cir. 1994)).
194. See Webster, 51 F. Stipp. 2d at 1375.
195. See generally Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 893 F. Supp. 419
(E.D. Pa. 1995); Webster, 51 F. Stipp. 2d at 1354; Eng'g Contractors Ass'n of Fla., Inc. v.
Metro. Dade County, 943 F. Supp. 1543 (S.D. Fla. 1996); Associated Gen. Contractors v.
City & County of Columbus, 936 F. Stipp. 1363 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
196. See, e.g.,
Associated Gen. Contractors,936 F. Supp. at 1409; Eng'g Contractors,943 F.
Supp. at 1564. The court noted that numerical disparities do not lead to the conclusion
that discrimination exists, and asserted that there are a myriad of factors that can legiti-
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court in EngineeringContractorsAssociation of South Florida,Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County pointed out that evidence has indicated that average MBEs tend to be smaller than majority-owned firms, which may be
a real/non-discriminatory reason why MBEs are not utilized as much
97
as majority-owned 'firms.1
Criticism of disparity studies persists, despite the fact that many
such studies have shown a disparity index sufficient to establish more
than a mere inference of discrimination. For example, Philadelphia
showed a disparity of 22.5 regarding its utilization of minority firms, as
compared to majority-owned firms; the city of San Francisco showed a
disparity of 22.4, which it found to be sufficient to raise an inference
of discrimination; Fulton County showed a disparity index of under 20
for all black owned-businesses and under 27 for constructors and developers; the Eleventh Circuit found that a disparity index of 10.8 was
sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination; and the
City of Denver's showing of disparity indices of 9, 14, 19, 43, 48, and
63 "raised an inference of race-based public discrimination on selected works projects."'

98

The use of statistics to prove discrimination is complex and involves the use of divergent approaches. Despite this complexity, courts
too often substitute their own judgment for those of the legislative
bodies involved in particular cases. Courts have been overly critical of
the census approach, where it has been used to identify the market
share of contract dollars going to minority firms or to assess these
firms' availability. Legislative fact-finding is far different from judicial
fact-finding in discrimination cases, yet courts are imposing higher
burdens of proof, as compared to the burden placed on Congress, on
jurisdictions that are implementing race-based programs. These
courts have insisted that jurisdictions offer rigid statistical proof of disparities regarding the jurisdictions' utilization of MBEs, as compared
to majority-owned firms. Congress, however, does not need to make
mately explain disparities. See Engg Contractors,943 F. Supp. at 1564. These include factors
such as the availability of MWBEs that are actually qualified to perform a particular contract's requirements, firm size, which will impact the dollar value of the contracts that can
be successfully bid for, and the capacity of firms able to handle multiple contracts at the
same time. See id.
197. See Eng' Contractors,943 F. Supp. at 1563.
198. See Steven K. DiLiberto, Setting Aside Set Asides: The New Standardfor Affirmative
Action Programs in the Construction Industry, 42 VILL. L. REv. 2039, 2082 (1997). See discussion, supra note 109, for a description of disparity ratios. The closer the number is to zero
(on a scale of 0-100), the greater the likelihood that a statistical inference of discrimination
can be made.
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such specific findings of discrimination-it is only expected to satisfy a
"strong basis in evidence" standard.
E.

Anecdotal Evidence

In Croson, the Court noted that there was "no direct evidence of
race discrimination on the part of the city [of Richmond] in letting
contracts or any evidence that the city's prime contractors had discriminated against minority-owned subcontractors."' 99 However, a majority of the Court implicitly endorsed jurisdictions' use of personal
0
accounts of discrimination to support their programs. 211
Personal accounts of actual discrimination or the individual effects of discriminatory practices may complement a jurisdiction's empirical evidence. As the Supreme Court has stated in the Title VII
context, anecdotal evidence may bring "cold numbers convincingly to
life." 20 1
Earlier post-Croson cases endorsed the concept of using anecdotal
evidence of discrimination to supplement statistical proof. In Associated General Contractors of California v. Coalitionfor Economic Equity,20 2
the Ninth Circuit found that the record in that case documented
a "vast number of individual accounts of discrimination, which
[brought] 'the cold numbers convincingly. to life.'"' 203 The court
opined that San Francisco's findings were substantially more specific
than those statistics that had been found inadequate in earlier cases
and that the city's numbers were "clearly based upon dozens of specific instances of discrimination. ' 20 4 The city's anecdotal evidence included "numerous reports of MBEs being denied contracts despite
being the low bidder, [qualified] MBEs being told they were not qualified ....
MBEs being refused work even after they were awarded the
contracts as the low bidder, and MBEs being harassed by City personnel to discourage them from bidding on city contracts." 20 5 In addition, on appeal, the city defendant had argued that "racial
discrimination [was] still prevalent within the San Francsico construc199. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
200. See id. at 509.
201. Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1521
(10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339
(1977)).
202. 950 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1991).

203.

Id. at 1415 (citation omitted).

204.
205.

Id. at 1416.
Id. at 1415.
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tion industry." 20 6 The court concluded that such a "combination of
convincing anecdotal and statistical evidence [was] potent," and
found that the city had established a strong basis in evidence of
discrimination207
Similarly, in Cone Corporation v. Hillsborough County,20 8 the Eleventh Circuit found that testimony from MBEs, who filed complaints to
the county about prime contractors' discriminatory practices, supplemented the county's statistical evidence of discrimination. 2()9 The
court stated, "Testimony regarding these complaints, combined with
. . . gross statistical disparities . . . provides more than enough evidence on the question of prior discrimination. ' 1 0 Cone was one of the
other earlier cases in which a court, applying Croson, reached a holding that sustained the government defendant's showing of discrimination. Other courts have also found anecdotal evidence to be as equally
appropriate as empirical evidence to support a showing of the existence of discrimination. 2 11 However, neither empirical evidence nor
select anecdotal evidence alone provides a strong enough basis in evidence for a jurisdiction to be able to demonstrate public or private
2 12
discrimination .to the extent the Croson standard requires.
In O'Donnell Construction Company v. District of Columbia,2 13 the
court of appeals reversed the lower court's decision to deny plaintiffs
request for a preliminary injunction, finding the anecdotal evidence
offered by the city inadequately, supplemented weak statistical evidence.2 1 4 The court asserted that anecdotal evidence was only useful
when it was offered to supplement an already strong statistical show21 5
ing of disparity.
In a similar case, Webster v. Fulton County, defendant county introduced a "substantial amount of anecdotal evidence in connection with
206. Id.
207. Id. (quoting Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 919 (9th Cir. 1991)).
208. 908 F.2d 908 (11th Cir. 1990).
209. See id. at 916.
210. Id. In reviewing the lower court's granting of summary judgment, the court of
appeals found the anecdotal evidence to be "potent." See id.
211. However, courts have found that anecdotal evidence must be strong for it to support a showing of the existence of discrimination. See Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa., Inc. v.
City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990, 1003 (3d Cir. 1993). "Although anecdotal evidence alone may, in
an exceptional case, be so dominant or pervasive that it passes muster under Croson, it is
insufficient here." Id.
212. See Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1520
(10th Cir. 1994).
213. 963 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
214. See id. at 427.
215. See id.
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the Brimmer-Marshall Study and the 1994 Post-Disparity Study." 2 16
Part of this anecdotal evidence consisted of confidential, in-depth interviews of seventy-six individuals regarding the ongoing effects of past
2 17
and present race and gender discrimination.
According to the district court, the interviewees had clearly
demonstrated that unfavorable discriminatory practices existed in the
county, especially with respect to private sector discrimination, within
which "unfavorable experiences of racial, ethnic and gender discrimination in several areas" were evinced. 218 However, after reviewing this
testimonial evidence, the district court asserted, "[T] he anecdotal evidence alone is insufficient to provide a strong basis in evidence to
justify the racial and ethnic preferences or sufficient probative evi'' 2 19
dence to justify the gender preferences.

In Associated General Contractors,yet another court was highly critical of the use of anecdotal evidence to support an MFBE program. In
that case, the district court elevated the standard for weighing the objectivity of the anecdotal method to that which, in the court's words,
"meet[s the] minimum standards of a reasonably competent forensic
investigation."' 220 The court condemned the methods the city had
used to gather anecdotal evidence of discrimination because the
methods had not focused on important details, such as the time and
place of the alleged discriminatory incidents or events. 22 1 Noting that

not every business disappointment of an M/FBE was an example of
discrimination, the court stressed that more than proof of such disap222
pointment was required to create an inference of discrimination.
The court stated:
216. Webster v. Fulton County, Ga., 51 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1378 (N.D. Ga. 1999).
217. Id. The district court noted that "[a]necdotal evidence may be used to establish
discrimination, especially if buttressed by relevant statistical evidence." Id. at 1363.
218. Id. at 1378. The interviewees reported these unfavorable experiences in areas such
as "(1) discrimination in bonding; (2) discrimination in financing; (3) discrimination in
employment opportunities; (4) double standards in performance and qualifications; (5)
limited access to private sector markets; and (6) stereotypical attitudes on the part of customers and buyers." Id.
219. Id. at 1379. The district court noted that only two individuals had testified to having experienced discrimination by Fulton County. See id. It further pointed out that "[o] ne
of these was a Native-American designer who complained bitterly that Fulton County
use[d] the MFBE Program to benefit only African-Anericans." Id. The court concluded
that the anecdotal evidence was "insufficient to support racial and ethnic preferences subject to strict scrutiny." Id.
220. Associated Gen. Contractors v. City & County of Columbus, 936 F. Supp. 1363,
1425 (S.D. Ohio 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 172 F.3d 411 (6th Cir. 1999).
221. Associated Gen. Contractors,936 F. Supp. at 1426-27.
222. See id. at 1439.
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The fact that a certain number of M/FBEs were denied loans or
were denied bonding or had a bid rejected is not probative of discrimination. An inference of discrimination could be drawn only if
similarly situated non-M/FBEs were treated more favorably or if
the disappointed M/FBE was in fact the lowest bidder. The fact
feel or believe that race or
that a disappointed M/FBE may think,
223
gender was a factor is not enough.
The court maintained that the standards regarding evidence of
discrimination against M/FBEs by banking and bonding companies
required information to be presented regarding the treatment of all

firms applying for loans or bonds.224 In other words, the fact that a
certain number of M/FBEs were denied loans or were denied bonding was not, according to the court, probative of discrimination. 225 An
inference of discrimination could arise only if non-M/FBEs were
treated favorably, as compared to M/FBEs. 226 The court concluded
that, regarding the causes of disparity, the city's investigation as set
forth through anecdotal evidence improperly emphasized perceptions
22 7
of discrimination rather than actual discrimination.
Other courts have suggested that interview or response biases are
important factors to be taken into consideration by fact-finders when
weighing the reliability of anecdotal evidence. Along these lines,
courts have been particularly hostile towards the role anti-discrimination advocates have played in gathering anecdotal evidence and in
conducting legislative hearings.0 28 However, it appears that lower
courts, such as the district court in Associated General Contractors, have
relied on a showing of actual proof of discrimination, rather than a
strong basis in evidence that such discrimination exists. 2 29 The courts
223. Id. at 1427. The court was unduly critical of the county's method for collecting
anecdotal evidence, imposing requirements as though the county were conducting a forensic investigation, rather than documenting alleged victims' accounts of discrimination.
However, the duty upon jurisdictions is to establish the factual basis from which the existence of discrimination may be inferred, not to prove or verify the existence of
discrimination.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See La Noue, supra note 9, at 33. The district court in Associated General Contractors
criticized the Minority Business Enterprise and-Legal Defense and Educational Fund for its
gathering of anecdotal evidence, suggesting that this was like putting the National Rifle
Association in charge of evaluating gun-control. See id. However, some believe that this
hostility ignores the role that advocacy groups have played historically, such as the important role the NAACP has played in documenting the existence of discrimination.
229. See id. For example, the district court in Associated General Contractorsasserted that
the investigation should focus on matters that are germane to the issue of discrimination
and should be informed by judicially recognized methods of proving discrimination. See
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are engaging in a de novo review of legislative fact-finding, basing their
decisions on their own inferences, rather than engaging in a determination of whether or not a strong basis in evidence of the existence of
discrimination had been presented at the trial level.
F.

Post-Enactment Evidence

Another muddled area regarding the establishment of a factual
predicate of discrimination is the legitimacy of defendant jurisdictions' use of post-enactment evidence to establish the necessary showing of discrimination. This type of evidence consists of statistics
gathered subsequent to jurisdictions' adoption of race-based programs for MBEs. In Croson, the Court stated that state or local governments, when they "possess evidence that their own spending practices
are exacerbating a pattern of discrimination [,] . . . must identify that
discrimination ... with some specificity before they may use race-con-

scious relief. ' 230 The Court did not require that all relevant evidence
of such discrimination be gathered prior to a program's adoption.
Many courts that have been presented with the question of the admis23
sibility of post-enactment evidence have held it to be admissible. '
As the Eleventh Circuit stated in Ensley Branch, NAACP v.
2 32

Seibeis:

Although Croson requires that a public employer show strong evidence of discrimination when defending an affirmative action
plan, the Supreme Court has never required that, before implementing affirmative action, the employer must have already proved
that it has discriminated. On the contrary, formal findings of discrimination need neither
precede nor accompany the adoption of
233
affirmative action.
Associated Gen. Contractors v. City & County of Columbus, 936 F. Supp. 1363, 1426 (S.D.
Ohio 1996).
230. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504 (1989).
231. See, e.g., Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513,
1521 (10th Cir. 1994); Contractors Ass'n ofE. Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990, 1003-04
(3d Cir. 1993); Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1991). But
see, e.g., Associated General Contractors,where the court stated that it would "hold postenactment evidence inadmissible," but would look at all the evidence which the city offered to
support its legislation. 936 F. Supp. at 1383. In criticizing post-enactment evidence, the
court stated, "The admission of postenactment evidence poses a risk of ... undesirable
consequences. It may encourage a government which has a strong political motivation to
enact race- and gender-based preferences to proceed without an adequate factual basis,
gambling that the legislation will not be challenged in court." Id. See also Rothe Dev. Corp.
v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 262 F.3d 1306, 1328-29 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
232. 31 F.3d 1548 (lth Cir. 1994).
233. Id. at 1565.
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In Concrete Works, the Court rejected plaintiff's argument that defendant's post-enactment evidence should be inadmissible: "Indeed,
post-enactment evidence, if carefully scrutinized for its accuracy, will
often prove quite useful in evaluating the remedial effects or short2 34
comings of the race-conscious program."
Recently, however, lower courts have rejected the use of post-enactment evidence. 235 In these cases, plaintiffs suing jurisdictions using
MBE programs have insisted that municipalities are required to have a
strong basis in evidence of discrimination before implementing a racebased program. These plaintiffs have interpreted Croson to require, at
least, that the jurisdiction's evidence show that discrimination existed
prior to the adoption of their programs.
In West Tennessee Chapter of Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc.
v. Board of Education,236 the district court acknowledged that the Ninth
and Tenth Circuits had specifically endorsed the view that a strong
2 37
basis in evidence may be established via post-enactment evidence.
However, the court ultimately concluded that, ordinarily, the use of
post-enactment evidence to show a compelling intent was contrary to
the Supreme Court precedent established in Wygant, Croson, and
23 8
Shaw, and that it was therefore inadmissible in this case.

The court reasoned that requiring pre-enactment evidence would
ensure a proper screening of the programs, under which the courts
would be better able to determine whether the actual purpose of the
particular MBE program was remedial or not.239 According to the

court, under strict scrutiny, the fact-finder is concerned not just with
"whether the factual predicate exists justifying the defendants' actions, but also whether the defendants' actual purpose was remedial." 240 Here, the district court interpreted the language in Croson as

requiring the defendant governmental entity to develop the necessary
234. Concrete Works, 36 F.3d at 1521.
235. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 730, 738
(6th Cir. 2000); see also Associated Util. Contractors of Md., Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of
Bait., 83 F. Supp. 2d 613, 620-621, 621 n.6 (D. Md. 2000) (disagreeing with the decisions
of several circuit courts that had found post-enactment evidence admissible, based on that
it believed that the Supreme Court had "provide[d] controlling authority on the role of
post enactment evidence in the 'strong basis in evidence' inquiry," and that these circuit
courts had not yielded to this authority).
236. 64 F. Supp. 2d 714 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).
237. See id. at 719.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. Id.
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evidence of discrimination before enacting a plan.2 4 1 Since the Croson
Court had characterized racial classification as a "highly suspect tool"
and had explained that the purpose of strict scrutiny was to smoke out
"illegitimate uses of race," 24 2 it made sense to the court to examine
defendant's pre-enactment evidence, before examining other evidence, to determine whether the MBE program at issue was implemented based on proper motives. 243 The court stated:
When evidence of remedial need is not developed until after a racial preference plan is enacted, that evidence provides no insight
into the motive of the legislative or administrative body. Thus,
while race-based programs may bejustified to remedy past discrimination, the governmental entity seeking to implement such a plan
"must identify that discrimination, public or private, with some
2 44
specificity before they may use race-conscious relief."1

The court further noted that the use of post-enactment evidence
may encourage governments with strong racial political motivations to
24 5
enact programs without a factual basis to do So.
In Associated Utility Contractors of Maryland v. Mayor & City Council
of Baltimore, the district court held that the City of Baltimore had to
limit itself to using pre-enactment evidence to defend its MBE program.2

46

There, the court found that there was no pre-enactment evi-

dence to support the city's adoption of subcontracting set-aside goals
of twenty percent for MBEs and three percent for WBEs. 2 4 7 Accord-

ingly, it held that the twenty percent goal was not supported by a
strong basis in evidence, and that the three percent goal was not substantially related to the asserted important governmental interest of
2
remedying gender discrimination.

48

In reaching its holding, the court concluded that the Supreme
Court's decision in Shaw had reaffirmed the Court's plurality opinion
in Wygant, where the Court had determined that pre-enactment evidence must provide a "strong basis in evidence" that a race-based remedy is necessary to solve the jurisdiction's existing disparity
241.
242.

See id. at 720.
Id. at 721.

243.

See id. at 717.

244.

Id. (quoting City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504 (1989)).

245.

See West Tennessee, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 720.

246. See Associated Util. Contractors of Md., Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Bait., 83 F.
Supp. 2d 613, 621 (D. Md. 2000).
247.

See id.

248. See id. at 622. The court noted that the Fourth Circuit had not ruled on whether
affirmative action measures must be justified by a strong basis in pre-enactment evidence.
See id. at 622 n.6.
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problems. 249 In Associated Utility Contractors, the court said that is was

"undisputed . . . that the City considered no evidence in 1999 before

promulgating the construction subcontracting set-aside of 20% for
. '...1.
I
MBEs and 3% for WBEs. 25 0
The legitimacy of post-enactment evidence consisting of anecdotal circumstantial evidence was addressed by the district court in Builders Association of Greater Chicago v. Cook County.25 1 The district court
noted that while Croson emphasized the need for a predicate study
justifying the creation of an MBE program, it did not have occasion to
address the question of the admissibility of circumstantial evidence
2 2
offered in the absence of a predicate study. 5
Therein lies the issue of the significance of post-enactment evidence in general. In the absence of race-based or gender-based initiatives, enacted to ensure the inclusion of MWBEs in the construction
industry, will there be sufficient utilization of minority and female
firms in the public or private sector, with respect to their availability?
Can proof of the non- or underutilization of MWBEs, combined with
evidence of a jurisdiction's failure to fix or to utilize numerical goals,
be considered probative circumstantial evidence of discrimination?
In Builders Association, Cook County defended its M/WBE program by using anecdotal and circumstantial evidence of discrimination in the private marketplace. The court concluded that defendant's
evidence did not show a pattern of majority contractors' refusing to
25 3
hire M/WBE subcontractors because of race, gender, or ethnicity.
Defendant attempted to establish a "strong basis in evidence" by showing the existence of a pattern of discrimination in the private marketplace of the subcontracting construction industry, based upon
anecdotal testimony that consisted mainly of post-enactment evidence. 254 The county chose not to rely on its earlier disparity study or
on pre-enactment evidence to support its MBE program. 255 Although
there was some testimony that supported the county's claim that mi249. See id. at 620-21.
250. Id. at 621.
251. 123 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1093 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
252. See id.
253. See id. at 1116.
254. See id. at 1093.
255. See id. Cook County chose not to rely on its'1993 Disparity Study, showing underutilization, and instead relied on post-enactment evidence. See id. No city or county, up to
this point, had successfully defended its program without using a disparity study, yet most
courts had invalidated most studies, as well. The county presented an employment discrimination model of proof in hopes of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by
majority contractors in the private sector. See id.
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nority subcontractors in, the area had suffered from discrimination in
the past, such testimony was primarily introduced to buttress the
256
county's evidence regarding present discriminatory conduct.
Interestingly, plaintiff Builders Association had moved for summary judgment on the basis that defendant had presented no evidence of race or gender discrimination that existed before the
enactment of the ordinance at issue. 25 7 Defendant county conceded
to plaintiff's claim that there was no specific evidence, regarding preenactment discrimination, to support its ordinance. 25 8 Instead, the
county relied on the theory that post-enactment evidence would show
that but for the existence of the race-based remedy, there would be
race and gender discrimination by prime contractors in, their selec259
tion of subcontractors for county work.

In addition, the county believed that anecdotal evidence would
show that prime contractors, who had hired minority subcontractors
for public work, would not hire minority subcontractors for private
work. 260 The district court denied plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment and held that defendant would be permitted to submit evidence to support its argument that prime contractors, involved on
public contracts, refused to hire minority and female firms for private
jobs. 26 1 The district court accepted- defendant's theory that a strong
basis in evidence of discrimination could be made out by showing that
discrimination was carried out not by the county itself but by general
contractors who were discriminating in the private sector. 262 However,
according to the court, defendant's actual evidence did not evince
what the county had set out to prove. 263 The court stated that defendant had made no effort to show discriminatory hiring in the private
sector, but rather, it "attempted to show that M/WBEs were not solicited for bids in the private sector."2 64 The theory was that because MBEs
were not approached to be considered for jobs, they could not be
2 65
considered, let alone hired, for private jobs.

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

See id. at 1112.
See id. at 1093.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 1094.
See id.
See id. at 1112.
See id.
Id.

265.

See id.
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Defendant's theory was that proof of failure to solicit was proof of
intentional discrimination. 266 The district court acknowledged the difficulties of showing discrimination under this theory. 26 7 According to
the court, in the private marketplace, a discriminatory refusal to hire
on the basis of race would have to be proven on a contract-specific
basis. 268 In most instances, however, it would be almost impossible to
prove discrimination based on a particular contractual situation. 269 As
the court stated:
The reason defendants' proof is cast in terms of failure to solicit
rather than failure to hire is that, with the evidence defendants
have, it would be impossible to prove the latter proposition. As defendants acknowledge, a discriminatory refusal to hire would have
to be proved on a contract-specific basis. One would have to know
which subcontractors were willing and able to do the particular
job, which among them was the best qualified, and which had the
lowest price. Then one would have to know what subcontractor was
hired by the general contractor. If it was a non-M/WBE, and one
or more qualified M/WBEs had submitted better bids, an inference of invidious discrimination would be justified unless the contractor could offer a persuasive
non-discriminatory reason for
270
choosing the non-M/WBE.
The court further opined that an examination into whether a
general contractor had been discriminating on a particular project
would entail an inquiry into the prime contractors' treatment of minority and female firms in each of the different trades that may be
involved in a single project. 27 1 In other words, in such a query, a fairer
picture of the prime contractor's behavior on the entire contract
272
would have to be taken into consideration.
The court in Builders Association seemed to enlarge the government's burden by requiring them to show that a prime contractor's
allegedly discriminatory conduct spanned across different trades, instead of only requiring them to offer evidence regarding how the contractor treated the M/WBE in question. 273 Still, it is not necessary for
defendant jurisdictions to demonstrate that contractors have treated
all MWBEs differently from majority-owned firms to establish that discriminatory conduct has taken place. The district court acknowledged
266.
267.
268.
269.

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.

270.
271.
272.
273.

Id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1112-13.
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the difficulties in proving discriminatory hiring: "It is understandable
... that defendants attempted to find a surrogate for proof of discriminatory failure to hire. Discriminatory failure to solicit, if proved,
27,4
might qualify."
The court offered a two-part inquiry, to be used when evidence of
contractors' failure to solicit firms might be sufficient proof of discrimination2 75 First, the court should consider whether there was
proof of a systemic failure to solicit; and secondly, it should determine
whether such failure, if found, was the result of racial, gender, or ethnic discrimination.2 76 Defendant's evidence in Builders Association consisted of testimony from minority and female contractors regarding
their having not been solicited to submit bids on private work, although they had requested such work. 277 Other accounts related that

certain MBE trade organizations had never received information concerning their bidding on private work.278 Finally, the city's witnesses
offered testimony which revealed that general contractors, for the
279
most part, had made no effort to solicit M/WBEs.
The court concluded that the evidence offered by defendant was
sufficient to establish a "systemic lack of any effort on the part of nonM/WBE general contractors to solicit bids specifically from M/WBEs
for subcontract work. 28°1 However, whether this conclusion resulted
28 1
in proof of a systemic denial of opportunity was another matter.
The court noted that not receiving an invitation to bid was not the
same as being denied the opportunity to bid. 28 2 The court identified

various ways in which subcontractors who were interested in bidding
could find out about contracts without being invited to bid.2 83 Moreo-

ver, the court noted that the uncontradicted evidence indicated that
contractors accepted unsolicited bids.2 84 Based upon these findings,

the court decided that no showing of a systematic denial of opportu28 5nity to bid had been made by defendant.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Id. at 1113.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

280.

Id.

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
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Even assuming that there had been a showing of contractors' systematic failure to solicit, the court had to determine whether the denial of opportunity to bid had been based on race. 286 The court

examined the anecdotal evidence offered by intervenor witnesses regarding discriminatory statements that had been made by supervisory
employees against minority and female contractors. 28 7 Noting that
this type of evidence might be sufficient to prove discriminatory motive against single employers, the court asserted that more evidence
was necessary to show systematic discrimination against an entire industry. 288 The court stated:
Defendants' burden is not to show that one, or even a few employers made biased decisions, but to show that the bias pervaded the
industry to the extent that it can fairly be called systemic. While the
anecdotal evidence may be sufficient to make a case against the
small number 28of9 general contractors the witnesses testified about,
it stops there.

This assertion obviously begs several questions. How much anecdotal evidence is sufficient to establish a strong basis in evidence of
discrimination in a particular geographic market? Would an inference
of discriminatory denial of opportunity to bid on private work arise
from testimony regarding overt discriminatory statements made by supervisory employers? How "pervasive" is alleged overt discrimination
in a particular industry if a certain number of firms refuse to solicit or
hire MWBE? Finally, how can a jurisdiction establish proof of systemic
discrimination in public or private sector contracting and what role
does anecdotal evidence play in a jurisdiction's attempt to establish
this proof?
In Cone, an early MBE case, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit found that the county's program was justifiable, where the
county had offered anecdotal evidence in order to meet its burden of
proof.29

0

Subsequently, the court reversed the lower court's decision

291
to grant plaintiff summary judgment.

286. See id.
287. See id. at 1114.
288. See id.
289. Id.
290. See Cone Corp. v. Hillsborough County, 908 F.2d 908, 916 (11th Cir. 1990).
291. See id. at 916. The court held that the testimony regarding the complaints, combined with evidence of gross statistical disparities, provided enough evidence on the question of prior discrimination and the need for a race-based program to avert summary
judgment. See id. Evidence showed that some contractors simply would not accept bids
from MBE firms, and if MBEs did bid, these contractors would shop the bids around so
that a non-minority firm would have the chance to under-bid the MBE. See id. Additionally,
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Outside of MBE contracting in public and in the private marketplace, the use of anecdotal evidence to establish discriminatory motive
has been deemed a proper method for jurisdictions to utilize. In employment discrimination cases,.courts have readily found that anecdotal evidence may be utilized by jurisdictions to prove the existence of
discriminatory hiring practices. Similarly, in EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck and
Company,292 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated, "we do not
agree that examples of individual instances of discrimination must be
293
numerous to be meaningful."

The defendant in Builders Association attempted to show the existence of discrimination by offering testimony of a number of witnesses
who said that while white contractors would hire minority firms on
public jobs, minority firms would not be hired or invited to bid on
private jobs. 294 There, the court stated that this testimony would only
be useful to show discrimination by particular employers, but that it
295
was insufficient to demonstrate discrimination in the private sector.
The court refused to infer that systematic discriminatory exclusion
had been established, noting that the fact that minority firms "were
hired on county jobs might be due to the fact that they were the best
qualified MWBEs, not that they were the best qualified bidders, or
even the low bidders." 296 The. court acknowledged that the evidence
suggested that some MWBEs were hired not necessarily because they
were the best-qualified firms for the jobs, but to fulfill MWBE requirements.

297

Furthermore, the court stated that there was virtually no evi-

dence offered that would suggest that any general contractor had
hired a non-MWBE subcontractor on a private project that was lessqualified or higher-priced than other available MWBE subcontractors. 298 The court further noted that there was no evidence of MWBEs

actually bidding on private sector work. 29 9 Therefore, the court found
that Cook County had not proved the existence of private marketplace discrimination.

30 0

"non-minority subcontractors and contractors got special prices and discounts from suppliers which were unavailable to MBE purchasers." Id.

292. 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
293. Id. at 311-12 (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339).
294. See Builders Ass'n of Greater Chi. v. Cook County, 123 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1114
(N.D. 11. 2000).
295.

See id.

296. Id.
297.
298.

See id.
See id.

299.
300.

See id. at 1114-15.
See id. at 1116.
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Accordingly, for ajurisdiction to be able to show systemic discrimination, which resulted in a denial of MBEs' opportunity to bid in the
private marketplace, the jurisdiction must not only show that minority
firms bidded on jobs for which they were not -solicited, but that
higher-priced bids, made by white subcontractors who were less qualified than certain MBEs, were accepted. 30 1 Uncovering and, subsequently, demonstrating this level of proof presents insurmountable
problems for jurisdictions attempting to justify their MBE programs.
Part of the evidence presented by defendant county in Builders
Association consisted of majority contractors' answers to interrogatories that focused on whether the contractors used MWBEs on private
sector jobs. 30 2 Based upon these answers, defendant's expert concluded that, in the absence of an ordinance requiring MWBE utilization by contractors, majority contractors would not use MWBEs on
public or private jobs. 30 3 Additionally, witness testimony from associations of MWBEs indicated a pattern of discriminatory exclusion of minorities from private sector work. 30 4 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's finding that defendant
Cook County had not established a strong basis in evidence and supported the lower court's decision to enjoin enforcement of Cook
County's race-based ordinance.3 0 5 Judge Posner, in a very cryptic portion of the opinion, criticized the county's theory upon which it set
out to prove that systematic discrimination had taken place in the private sector. 30 6 He wrote:
We recur in this hypothetical to one of the most dubious propositions advanced by the County in this case-that a comparison of
the fraction of minority subcontractors on public and private

projects established discrimination against minorities by prime
contractors on the latter type of project. The larger the quota im301. See id. at 1114-15.
302. See Builders Ass'n of Greater Chi. v. Cook County, 123 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1095
(N.D. Ill.
2000).
303. See id. Defendant's expert analyzed intervenor witnesses' responses to interrogatories regarding contractors' utilization of MWBEs on non-county and private projects. Interrogatories were sent to 348 contractors. Only ten percent, or thirty-two, of the witnesses
responded. Plaintiff claimed that this limited number of answers was insufficient to account for any meaningful significance. See id.
304. See id. at 1095-1097. To corroborate a pattern of discriminatory denial of opportunity to bid, defendant offered testimony of representatives from various trade associations,
including Black Contractors United, the Federation of Women Contractors, the HispanicAmerican Construction Industry Association, the Illinois Association of Minority Contractors, and the Association of Asian Construction Enterprises. See id. at 1088.
305. Builders Ass'n of Greater Chicago v. County of Cook, 256 F.3d 642, 648 (7th Cir.
2001).
306. See id. at 647-48.
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posed on prime contractors on hiring subcontractors for public
projects, the smaller will be the percentage of subcontractors hired
for private projects even if there is no discrimination by prime contractors, simply because the quota will have drawn minority subcontractors into the -public projects and driven majority
3- 7
subcontractors out of those projects and into the private ones.
Posner equates goals with quotas and does not indicate what would
happen to minority subcontractors in the private sector in the absence
of race-based goals. Presumably, minority availability would increase
and, in the absence of discrimination, so would utilization.
G.

Burden of Proof and Burden of Production

Lower courts, reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to sustain the
constitutionality of state and local M/FBE programs, have seldom
found that the existence of a strong basis in evidence of discrimination has warranted race-based remedial action. While Croson placed
the initial burden of proof on the defendant local jurisdictions to establish a strong basis in evidence, 3t1 few jurisdictions have been able
to satisfy the first prong of the strict scrutiny analysis.
Following Croson, lower courts have placed the initial burden of
production on the state or local governmental actors, requiring them
to demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that race and gender conscious programs were aimed at remedying identified past and/or present discrimination. 30 9 According to Croson, the district court must
first make a factual determination as to whether the defendant has
established a strong basis in evidence to support the conclusion that a
remedial racial or ethnic program was necessary.3 'l This does not
mean that the government must establish and prove the existence of
actual discrimination, but only that it must establish a prima facie case
31
of the existence of discrimination. '
307. Id.
308. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 539 (1989).
309. See Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990, 1006 (3d Cir.
1993).
[W]here a city defends an affirmative action ordinance as a remedy for past discrimination, issues of proof are handled as they are in other cases involving a
pattern or practice of discrimination. Croson's reference to an 'inference of discriminatory exclusion' based on statistics, as well as its citation to [two] Title VII
pattern cases, supports this interpretation.
Id.
310.
311.

See Croson, 488 U.S. at 539.
See id.
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Notwithstanding the initial burden, i.e., that of production, the
31 2
ultimate burden of proof is on the party challenging the program.
Thus, the plaintiff must persuade the court that the "race-based preference were not intended to- serve the identified compelling
313
interest."
In evaluating the strength of this evidentiary showing, courts have
not received any clear guidance as to what amounts to a showing of a
"strong basis in evidence." In Builders Association, for example, the
court seemed to impose a requirement upon the defendant city that it
prove that non-minority firms, who were less qualified and had higher
prices than minority firms, were still selected to perform private sector
jobs over minority firms. 3 14 It would be virtually impossible to examine
every private sector negotiation and subcontract in order to determine who was the best-qualified and most willing and able subcontractor to perform a particular job amongst those considered for the job.
Additionally, some courts have striken evidence regarding prejudicial statements made by supervisors, considering such statements to
amount only to evidence of individual employees', rather than companies', improper motives. In the day-to-day world of business transactions, how does one uncover the hidden improper discriminatory
motives of employers or the discriminatory statements made behind
closed doors, which serve as the basis for minority bids being rejected?
Many disparity studies have reported the existence of a "good old-boy
network" in the bidding community, where women and blacks have
31 5
been implicitly excluded from the process by majority contractors.
How does one prove the exclusionary practices of this informal network within the construction industry? Would whistle blowers ever
come forth, admitting racial and gender bias?
The difficulties of proving systemic discrimination in the construction market are complex and involve many variables, yet Croson
commands that governments meet their burdens of proof with speci312. See, e.g.,
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277-78 (1986) (Powell, J.,
plurality opinion). The ultimate burden remains on the plaintiff to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of an affirmative action program. See also Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v.
City & County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1522 (10th Cir. 1994). "An affirmative action response to discrimination is sustainable against an equal protection challenge so long as it is
predicated upon strong evidence of discrimination."
313. Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 91 F.3d 586, 597 (3d Cir. 1996).
314. See Builders Ass'n of Greater Chi. v. Cook County, 123 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1114-15
(N.D. Ill.
2000).
315. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.Slater, 228 F.3d 1147, 1168 (10th Cir. 2000)
[Adarand VII].
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ficity.3 16

Particularized findings of discrimination are required not
only for the purpose of setting the inquiry's boundaries, but are
17
equally important in defining the scope of the remedy.
The Court in Croson established that a pattern of discriminatory
acts could, if supported by statistical proof, lend support to a local
government's determination that broader relief, than that which was
solely directed at helping individual victims of discrimination, isjustified. 3 18 However, individual instances of discrimination alone are in3 19
sufficient to justify an MBE program.
Obviously, because of the heterogeneous and elastic nature of
the construction industry, which includes various trades, sub-industries and specialties, the qualifications for determining the suitability
of a "subcontractor" are not interchangeable with the qualifications
for determining the same regarding a typical "employee." Firms that
are qualified to perform one particular job may be ill-suited for another job.
However, is there a difference between minority firms, who perform jobs in the public sector, and the same firms who seek to perform the same type of work in the private sector? Aside from the issue
of qualifications, there are many other factors, such as firm size, financial capital, bonding capacity, and nepotism, which may affect a contractor's hiring decision on a particular job, blurring the issue of
discriminatory treatment.
The framework for allocation of burden of production and for
the presentation of proof in cases of employment discrimination appears to be the same for cases of intentional discrimination under section 1981 of 42 U.S.C., which covers racial discrimination in
contractual arrangements. 320 A prima facie case regarding individual
instances of discriminatory treatment may be difficult to prove in an
industry-wide market. This is because the non-solicitation of a subcontracting firm bidding on a particular contract is the exact thing that
prevents a court from being able to resolve the second prong of the
McDonnell Douglas framework, i.e., whether that subcontractor was denied the contract or job.
316. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 504.
317. See id. at 470.
318. See id. at 509.
319. See id.
320. See Howard v. BP Oil Co., 32 F.3d 520, 524 (11th Cir. 1994) (setting forth that
plaintiff, a black applicant for a gasoline dealership, would be required to present evidence
on how many blacks applied for dealer positions and were rejected, as well as evidence on
the success rates of equally qualified white applicants).
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In summary, discriminatory hiring practicesthat harm minority
or female contractors present special problems regarding the issue of
proof. In the private marketplace, majority firms rarely, if ever, maintain information by race or ethnicity. Moreover, the difficulty of quantifying the number of contracts and subcontracts being made in a
given market, at any given time, compounds the problem. Still, jurisdictions could identify, as in Cook County, majority firms that utilize the
same minority firms on public contracts as they do on private contracts. In sum, it is difficult for local governments to establish the existence of industry-wide discriminatory practices, such as failure to
solicit or to use minority firms, by using anecdotal evidence.

II.

Adarand Constructors, Inc. and Strict Scrutiny of the
Federal Government's MBE Programs

In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (Adarand III), the first
Adarand case before the Supreme Court, the Court held that strict
scrutiny was the proper standard for courts to apply regarding the federal government's use of racial classifications. 32 1 Thus, the Court broadened Croson's mandate by subjecting even the federal government's use
of racial classifications to the rigors of strict scrutiny. The Adarand III
decision addressed the question that had been left unanswered in
Croson-whether any standard of review lesser than strict scrutiny
should be applied regarding the federal government's use of racial
classifications.
At issue in Adarand IIIwas a DOT program that allowed for prime
contractors to be compensated or awarded financial bonuses if they
hired subcontractors who were certified as small businesses controlled
by "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals."' 322 The program also required that the prime contractors "presume that such
[disadvantaged individuals] include[d] minorities or any other individuals found to be disadvantaged by the Small Business Administration [ ("SBA") ."323
The Mountain Gravel & Construction Company had been
awarded the prime contract for a highway construction project in Col321. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) [Adarand III].
322. Id. at 200. The Subcontractor Compensation Clause ("SCC") provided a financial
bonus of up to ten percent to a prime contractor for employing a DBE. See id. This was
used to implement federal statues that sought to meet certain aspirational goals of ten
percent DBE participation on federal contracts. See id.
323. Id.
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orado, financed by federal funds. 424 Adarand Constructors, Inc., a
Colorado-based highway construction company specializing in guardrail work, submitted the low bid to Mountain Gravel. 325 However,
Gonzales Construction Company, which had been certified as a small
business owned and controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals," was awarded the contract. - 26 Adarand, which
had not been designated as one of the above-mentioned certified dis327
advantaged small businesses, filed suit.

Adarand contended that the federal government's use of raceconscious presumptions, to determine which businesses were socially
and economically disadvantaged, violated the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. 328 Specifically, Adarand argued that
but for the additional compensation Mountain Gravel obtained from
hiring Gonzales, Adarand would have been hired. 32)
The district court applied an intermediate standard of review, upholding the DOT's statutory provision, which defined DBEs and set
forth goals for DBE participation in governmental contracting. 33 °1The
court of appeals, also using an intermediate standard of review, upheld the program "because it [was] narrowly tailored to achieve its
significant governmental purpose of providing subcontracting opportunities for small [DBEs] .

.

. ."'

The Supreme Court reversed. 33 2

The Supreme Court in Adarand III reached a consensus regarding the proper standard of review for courts to use in adjudging the
constitutionality of race-based classifications, regardless of the jurisdiction that is using such classifications. 31 The Court held that "all racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny."33-1 4 "In other words," the Court continued, "such classifications
324.
325.
326.
327.

See id.
See id. at 205.

See id.
See id.
328. See id. at 205-06.
329. See id. at 206.
330. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp. 240, 245 (D. Colo. 1992)
[Adarand 1].
331. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537 (10th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter
Adarand II].
332. See Adarand Ill, 515 U.S. at 227.
333. See id.
334. Id.
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are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.

' 33 5

The Adarand III decision, as one commentator has stated, "[represented] the culmination of 17 years of Supreme Court litigation on
this subject [of race-based classifications]."'36 This commentator also

pointed out that the decision also "represents one of few unified pronouncements from the Court on the standard of review required to
evaluate equal protection challenges to race-based affirmative action
3 37
programs.
In Adarand III, the Supreme Court did not determine that the
federal program at issue was unconstitutional, rather, it remanded the
case to the court of appeals for a determination of whether the government's use of racial classifications was justified by a compelling in33 8
terest and was narrowly tailored.
Even prior to the Adarand I decision in 1995, then-President Bill
Clinton ordered a review of federal affirmative action programs to determine how the federal programs were designed and whether they
"indeed worked" and were fair. 339 The 1995 .report, issued in July, con-

cluded that affirmative action programs would advance the goal of
equal opportunity by redressing discrimination and that the programs
were "fair and non-burdensome.."340 However,, the report also noted

that the Supreme Court's Adarand Idecision, which had been reached
while the report was being carried out, had changed the landscape of
federal affirmative action and required a more thorough empirical
analysis which accounted for the new strict scrutiny standard.3 4 1
In response to the report, President Clinton gave general support
to affirmative action programs, and suggested that while some programs needed reform, a "mend it, don't end it" approach should be
adopted. 342 Following the Presidential Report, the Department ofJustice ("DOJ") commenced a review of federal affirmative action programs to determine whether the programs were in compliance with
the Court's decision in Adarand III, i.e., whether they would meet the
335.

Id.

336.

Goring, supra note 25, at 261.

337.
338.

Id.
See Adarand Il, 515 U.S. at 237.

339. Memorandum on Affirmative Action, 2 PuB. PAPERS OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 1114
(July 19, 1995).
340. See id.
341. See id.
342. Remarks on Affirmative Action at the National Archives and Records Administration, 2 PUB. PAPERS OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 1106 (July 19, 1995).
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standards of strict scrutiny. 343 Subsequently, the DOJ issued a notice,
in which it proposed reforms to the federal affirmative action
system.

344

The initial review focused only on affirmative action programs
that were under the federal government's own direct control. 345 It was
not concerned with programs that had been undertaken by states and
localities pursuant to those jurisdictions' receiving of federal funds
346
from the DOT.

The authors of the DOJ's proposal based their conclusions on
evidence that included information Congress had gathered from numerous studies on discrimination that had been conducted by state
and local governments nationwide. 34 7 They concluded that federal
contracting, in the absence of affirmative action, would continue to
reflect the impact of discrimination against minority businesses and
underserved communities. 3 48 The authors of the DOJ's notice also
found that affirmative action in federally-controlled programs wasjustified and that the federal government had a compelling interest in
349
initiating such programs.

The notice and its supplemental proposed reforms focused on
ensuring that the means of securing the congressionally mandated
compelling interest of remedying past and present discrimination
were narrowly tailored.3 5°1 In the proposal, it was noted that Adarand
commanded that programs employing race-conscious measures be
narrowly tailored.3 5 ' Based on this command, the DOJ proposed sta-

tistical "benchmarks" to represent goals for SDB participation in fed343. See generally Department of Justice, Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in
Federal Procurement, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,042, 26,050 (1996) (proposing reforms to the federal affirmative action system).
344. See id.
345. See id.
346. See id. at 26,050.
347. See id.
348. See id. The authors of the report noted, "All told, the evidence that the Justice
Department has collected to date is powerful and persuasive. It shows that the discriminatory barriers facing minority-owned businesses are not vague and amorphous manifestations of historical societal discrimination. Rather, they are real and concrete, and reflect
ongoing patterns and practices of exclusion, as well as the tangible, lingering effects of
prior discriminatory conduct." Id. at 26,051 n.5.
349. See id. at 26,042.
350. See id.
351. See id. Here, the DOJ was careful to point out that its proposed reforms were
intended to "target race-conscious remedial measures to markets in which the evidence
indicates that discrimination continues to impede the participation of minority firms in
contracting." Id. at 26,051 n.6.
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eral contracts.3 52 Under this proposal, the Department of Commerce,
in consultation with the General Services Administration, would establish appropriate benchmark standards, regarding minority utilization,
for each industry classification.3 5 3 These standards would be compared with the actual minority participation statistics in their respec354
tive industry and, in some cases, region.
In arriving at the benchmark standards, the DOJ recommended
that they be formulated based on the level of DBE participation "one
would reasonably expect to find in a market absent discrimination or
its effects. '355 They suggested that these figures be based on census
data and the number of SDBs available and qualified to perform the
35 6
particular work at issue.
Importantly, the report provided that, in addition to calculating
the capacity of existing minority firms, "the proposed system [would]
examine evidence, if any, demonstrating that minority business formation and operation in a specific industry has been suppressed by discrimination. '' 35 7 Such evidence would include direct evidence of
discrimination in the private and public sectors in areas such as obtaining credit, surety guarantees and licensing, and would also include
evidence of discrimination in pricing and contract awards. 358 The report rioted the difficulty in calculating the impact of discrimination in
various markets but concluded that "the benchmark limitations represent a reasonable effort to establish guidelines" for the use of race359
conscious measures.
Other significant changes to federal affirmative action programs
occurred after the Adarand IIIdecision. Notably, these factual changes
altered the procedural posture and outcome of the remanded
Adarand III case. The SCC, originally the centerpiece of the federal
program, which had been subjected to strict scrutiny, had been discontinued by the time the district court revisited the case. Significant
changes to the DOT's DBE programs occurred in 1999 because of the
passage of the Transportation Equity Act for the Twenty-First Century-the TEA-21. These changes pertained to the procurement of
federal funds for highway projects initiated by states and localities.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

See id. at 26,045-46.
See id. at 26,045 n.12.
See id.
See id.
See id.
ld. at 26,045, 26,046 n.13.
See id. at 26,046 n.13.
See id.

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

Following the remand of Adarand III, the district court, in
Adarand X, concluded that while the government had established a
compelling interest for the SCC under strict scrutiny, the statutory
presumptions upon which the SCC was based were not narrowly tailored.3 611 The court, granting summary judgment for the plaintiff,
found that the program was not narrowly tailored to meet the compelling interest of remedying specified discrimination because its design
allowed for DBEs who were not in fact "disadvantaged" to benefit
from the program. - 6 1 At the same time, the district court asserted, the
program failed to help non-minority-owned companies who actually
36 2
were "disadvantaged."
Following Adarand IV, the Court of Appeals, in Adarand V, considered the petitioner construction company's case moot. - 63 The Tenth
Circuit vacated the district court's decision to invalidate the SCC program because Adarand had applied for and was granted SDB-certification by the Colorado DOT.164 The Supreme Court, however, reversed
the Court of Appeal's decision to vacate and remanded the case back
to the Tenth Circuit for its consideration of the case's merits. 315 Subsequently, the DOT issued new regulations that suspended the use of
the SCC. 36 6 Additionally, Congress re-authorized the TEA-21, finding
that discrimination continued to affect the ability of minority groups
to participate in highway construction projects and that race-based
67
programs would be an effective remedy regarding this problem.1
Congress debated at length about extending DBE programs and,
subsequently, new DOT regulations, which implemented new congressional legislation, were enacted. Importantly, these regulations
sought to provide DBE-certification only to those firms that were actually owned and controlled by individuals who were in fact socially and

360. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 965 F. Supp. 1556, 1577, 1584 (D. Col. 1997)
[hereinafter Adarand V].
361. See id. at 1580.
362. See id.
363. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 169 F.3d 1292, 1295 (10th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Adarand V].
364. See id. at 1296-97.
365. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 224 (2000) [hereinafter
Adarand VI].
366. See Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-178
§ 1101(b)(l), 112 stat. 107 (1998) [hereinafter TEA-21]. While the Tenth Circuit, in
Adarand V, was reviewing the district court's ruling, Congress re-enacted the TEA-21.
367. See id.
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economically disadvantaged, based on individualized showings of eco3 68

nomic disadvantage.

For example, the regulations required that owners of firms applying for DBE certification submit a signed and notarized statement that
369
attested to their status as socially and economically disadvantaged.
In this statement, the owners had to establish that they had been "subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of their
identity as a member of a group without regard to their individual
qualities. 3' 8 70 The owners also had to confirm that their "ability to com-

pete in the free enterprise system [had] been impaired due to diminished capital and credit opportunities -as compared to others in the
37 1
same business area who [were] not socially disadvantaged.
In essence, the new regulations sought to guard against over-inclusiveness. The statutory presumption that certain groups are considered socially disadvantaged because of their minority status remained,
but was nonetheless rebuttable.3 7 2 Now, individuals who were not
among the minority groups that enjoyed the statutory presumption
could still qualify for DBE-certification by proving that they were socially and economically disadvantaged under the SBA standards. 37 3
Other aspects of the new regulations represented an effort to narrowly tailor particular remedies. The new DOT regulations asked recipients to set their annual goals for DBE-participation, based upon
local market conditions. 374 Unlike the prior program, the statutory
ten percent utilization goal was a national aspiration. 375 Moreover,
each recipient of the program's benefits had to establish his or her
own DBE-utilization goals, based on their own methodology.' 7 6 When
developing these plans to meet their overall goals, recipients had to

368. 49 C.F.R. § 26.67 (2000). This "individualized showing" requires an applicant/
business owner to attest to his personal net worth, while submitting the appropriate documentation to support this attestation. If an applicant's net worth exceeds $750,000, the
presumption of economic disadvantage is conclusively rebutted and the individual is not
eligible for DBE-certification. Id.
369. See id.
370. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(5) (2000).
371.

Id. § 637(a) (6).

372.
373.
374.
375.
376.

See 49 C.F.R. § 26.67(a) (1), (b)(2) (2000).
See id. § 26.67(d).
See id. § 26.45(c) (5).
See id. § 26.41(c).
See id. § 26.45(b).
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use race-neutral means to involve DBEs before resorting to race-con37 7
scious methods.
A.

The Government's Showing of Discrimination Under Strict
Scrutiny

In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater (Adarand VII),378 the Tenth
Circuit finally addressed the question of whether the government had
established a compelling interest for employing the (now defunct)
SCC to remedy the effects of racial discrimination. While acknowledging that Congress had the power to address racial discrimination that
had been or was currently being carried out by the states, the court
held that the federal government had a compelling interest in not
perpetuating the effects of racial discrimination regarding the way in
379
which it chose to distribute its own federal funds.
The court of appeals then determined whether the actual evidence proffered by the government established a strong basis in evidence of the existence of past and present discrimination in the
publicly funded highway contractor market. 8 °1 In examining the evidentiary basis for Congress' case, the court noted that Congress had
previously considered the issue of discrimination in government-created contracts. 3 81' The court cited to the DOJ's Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in FederalProcurement, where Congress had conducted
over thirty public hearings concerning minority businesses.3 8 2 The
court determined that statements from public hearings, made by public officials, and congressional reports did not themselves establish evidence of discrimination. 383 However, the court found support for the
argument that discrimination existed, where the government had
presented evidence of two kinds of discriminatory barriers to the utili377. See id. § 26.51(a)-(b). The new regulations provide that agencies are to arrange
solicitations of firms to include all small businesses, not just disadvantaged business. Further, technical, bonding and financial assistance may be provided, as means of accomplishing the "race-neutral" requirement. Even if a contract goal is set and not met, a prime
contractor that demonstrates that it has made a good faith effort to achieve these goals,
must be awarded the contract. See id. § 26.53(a).
378. 228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000) [Adarand VII].
379. See id. at 1165.
380. See id. at 1166-1175.
381. See id. at 1178.
382. See id. at 1167 (citing to Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement, supra note 343). The court of appeals also took judicial notice of hearings that
had been conducted before, and testimony that had been presented to, congressional
committees and subcommittees of the government. Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1167.
383. See id. at 1166.
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zation of minority subcontracting, which established a link between
3 4
federal funds and private sector discrimination.
After noting that the City of Denver in Concrete Works had not
demonstrated the necessary showing of discrimination to justify its
MBE program, the court of appeals stated:
[T]he evidence presented by the government in the present case
demonstrates the existence of two kinds of discriminatory barriers
to minority subcontracting enterprises, both of which show a
strong link between racial disparities in the federal government's
disbursements of public funds for construction contracts and the
channeling of those funds due to private discrimination. The first
discriminatory barriers are to the formation of qualified minority
subcontracting enterprises due to private discrimination, precluding from the outset competition for public construction contracts
by minority enterprises. The second discriminatory barriers are to
fair competition between minority and non-minority subcontracting enterprises, again due to private discrimination, precluding existing minority firms from effectively competing for public
construction contracts. The government also presents further evidence in the form of local disparity studies of minority subcontractmarkets after the removal
ing and studies of local subcontracting
385
of affirmative action programs.
The court of appeals found that those two barriers, i.e., obstruction of business formation and hindrance to fair competition between
minority and non-minority enterprises, were due to private sector discrimination.3 8 6 With regard to business formation, the court of appeals found that the anecdotal and statistical evidence, derived from
numerous congressional hearings and investigations, indicated that
prime contractors, unions, and financial lenders, impeded the formation of minority firms.3 8 7 According to the court, the evidence
showed, among other things, that 1) prime contractors, through the

existence of "old boy networks," refused to employ minority subcontractors; 2) subcontractors' unions' blocked minority subcontractors'
384. See id.
385. Id. at 1167-68. The court cited congressional reports that had made clear that the
construction industry was a generalized family business, requiring family connections in
order to become a valid competitor within the "business." See id. at 1168 (citing H.R. REP.
No. 103-870, at 15 n.36 (1994); citing also Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement, supra note 343, at 26,054-58). In examining what evidence demonstrated a compelling interest, the court of appeals looked at public and private
discrimination not only in government procurement, but also in the contracting industry
generally, recognizing that "any findings Congress has made as to the entire construction
industry are relevant." Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1167 (citing Concrete Works of Colo., Inc.
v. City & County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1523, 1529 (10th Cir. 1994)).
386. See Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1170.
387. See id. at 1168.
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access to union membership, which is a condition for receiving work
in the business; and 3) lending institutions engaged in discriminatory
lending practices. and discriminatorily denied MBEs access to capital,
which stymied the formation of minority businesses.3811 Regarding this
last finding, the court of appeals found that "the government's evidence [was] particularly striking in the area of the race-based denial
of access to capital, without which the formation of minority subcontracting enterprises [would have been] stymied."3 8 9
As for the competition barrier, the court of appeals acknowledged, again, that based on congressional hearing investigators' findings, discrimination practiced by prime contractors, business
networks, suppliers, and bonding companies and carried out in accordance with private sector custom, fostered an "uneven playing field
for minority subcontracting enterprises."' 3 90 According to the court,
the government presented powerful evidence that supported the conclusion that, where affirmative action plans had not been enacted, the
construction industry remained a closed network with longstanding
relationships, which served to exclude MBEs from bidding on subcontracts. 391 The court of appeals stated, "the government has also
presented sobering evidence that when minority firms are permitted
to bid on subcontracts, prime contractors often resist working with
them."

39 2

The court further noted that Congress had found the systematic
exclusion of MBEs to be the result of sometimes-outright racism.3 9 3
The court cited to and quoted from testimony given at congressional
hearings following Croson, which were held before the subcommittees
on civil rights. 3, 9 4 One witness had stated, "we must not for a moment
388. Id. at 1168-69. The court cited numerous local studies and a significant amount of
testimony that was presented at various congressional hearings. See e.g., Availability of Credit
to Minority-Owned Small Businesses: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. Supervision, Regulation & Deposit Ins. of the House Comm. on Banking, Fin. & Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 19-20
(1994) (statement of Toni Hawkins, Executive Director, National Black Business Council);
Disadvantaged Business Set Asides in Transportation Construction Projects: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Procurement, Innovation & Minority Enter. Dev. of the House Comm. on Small Bus.,
100th Cong. 26 (1988) (statement of Joann Payne, President, PSM Consultants).
389. Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1169.
390. Id. at 1170.
391. See id. at 1170.
392. Id.
393. See id. at 1171.
394. See id. (citing I-low State and Local Governments Will Meet Croson Standard (Minority
Set-Asides): HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Civ. & Const. Rights of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 100th Cong. 53-54 (1989)). *
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underestimate the role of continuing pervasive blunt discrimination
'
by the private market."

39 5

Additionally, the court of appeals found that MBEs were unable
to compete with non-minority firms due to bonding discrimination
and an old boy network in bonding that served to exclude minority
firms.3 96 The court of appeals also found that the government had
demonstrated that discrimination was carried out by suppliers, where
39 7
non-minority firms received special prices for goods and services.
The court of appeals concluded that Adarand had failed to meet its
burden of rebutting the government's showing of discrimination in
the federal construction subcontracting market.3 9 8 Specifically, the

court of appeals rejected Adarand's characterization of the various
congressional reports offered by the government and its attempt to
find fault with the methodology employed by the government regarding the local disparity studies' use of "supplemental evidence." 3 99 Rejecting petitioner's criticism of Congress' reliance on local disparity
studies, which petitioner characterized as conclusory and unreliable,
the court of appeals concluded that the government had established a
strong basis in evidence of pervasive discrimination as a matter of
law. 4110 Subsequently, the court held that Congress could take action

to remedy the specific racial discrimination evinced by Congress and
to remedy such discrimination's lingering effects in the construction

395. Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1171 (citing How State and Local Governments Will Meet
Croson Standard (Minority Set-Asides): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civ. & Const. Rights of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 53-54 (1989) (statement of Marc Bendick,
Bendick & Egan Economic Consultants, Inc.)).
396. See Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1171-72 (citing Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement, supra note 343, at 26,059-60). The court cited to numerous
congressional hearings and a significant amount of testimony, finding that there was
strong overt racial discrimination in the bonding market. See id. at 1171. The court also
cited to testimony from local Louisiana' and Atlanta disparity studies, within which the
existence of disparities between minority firms' and non-minority firms' ability to obtain
bonding was evinced. See, e.g., id. at 1172 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson: Impact
and Response: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Urban and Minority-Owned Bus. Dev. of the Senate
Comm. on Small Bus., 101st Cong. 40-41, 43 (statement of Andrew Brimmer, President,
Brimmer & Co., Inc., Economic and Financial Consultants)).
397. See Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1172.
398. See id. at 1174.
399. See id. at 1175. The court stated, "We reject the decidedly vague urgings of
Adarand's amici curiae to reject disparity studies as biased and/or insufficiently reliable."
Id. at 1174 n.14.
400. See id. at 1175.
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industry. 41' Importantly, the court noted that Congress need not
stand idly by and only proscribe anti-discrimination policies. 41 2
With respect to Adarand IIl's and Croson's narrow tailoring requirement, the court of appeals found that the SCC, which had been
used as a financial incentive to encourage primary contractors to hire
DBEs, was unconstitutional. 40 3 Furthermore, the court held that the
presumption that certain minority groups and women were economically disadvantaged, solely because of their status as minorities or women, was unconstitutional because actual need for assistance was not
14
based on actual individual circumstances.4

Other aspects of the program, however, were found to be narrowly
tailored, as amended under the new certification regulations. 405 The
appeals court noted ihat the new regulations provided a rebuttable
presumption of "social disadvantage" and in order to establish this
presumption, the applicant would have to "submit a narrative statement describing the circumstances of the purported economic disadvantage.'"'4

6

The court found that the new regulations were narrowly

tailored because they had delineated limits on DBE participation-an
important factor to include, to ensure narrow tailoring, in the design
of any race-conscious relief program. 4017 The court found that the new
401. See id. at 1175-1176. The court stated that the evidence demonstrated that racebased barriers to entry into the industry and the ongoing effects of race-based impediments to success, faced by minority contracting enterprises, are caused by either continuing discrimination in the relevant market or "lingering effects of past discrimination." See
id. at 1176. The Tenth Circuit further contrasted the government's showing of the lingering effects of discrimination with the local government's showing of the same in Concrete
Works. See id. at 1175-76. There, the court held that the plaintiff had specifically identified
and put forth evidence showing statistical flaws in the data, justifying the City of Denver's
affirmative action case, thus precluding summary judgment. See Concrete Works of Colo.,
Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1530-31 (10th Cir. 1994).
402. See Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1176.
403. See id. at 1179.
404. See id. at 1184-85. "Mindful of the Supreme Court's mandate to exercise particular care in examining governmental racial classifications, we conclude that the 1996 SCC
was insufficiently narrowly tailored as applied in this case and is thus unconstitutional
under Adarand ll's strict standard of scrutiny. Nonetheless, after examining the current
SCC and DBE certification programs, we conclude that the 1996 defects have been remedied, and the relevant programs now meet the requirements of narrow tailoring." Id. at
1187.
405. See id. at 1179. For instance, the regulations provide that recipients must meet the
"maximum feasible portion of [their] overall goal by using race-neutral means of facilitating DBE participation." 49 C.F.R. § 26.51 (a) (2000).
406. Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1185.
407. ,See id.at 1180.
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programs were appropriately limited to last no longer "than the discriminatory effects [they were] designed to eliminate."' 40 8
The Adarand decision was of course appealed by Adarand to the
Supreme Court. The appeal was foreseeable, considering that the
court of appeals' decision was the first to have addressed the constitutionality of the DOT's DBE program, following Adarand III, and the
first to have found that the government had met its burden of presenting a compelling state interest in this context. The ultimate Adarand
case would serve as the litmus test for future federal affirmative action
programs.
After much anticipated legal and political debate, the new administration under President George Bush decided to defend the constitutionality of its federal DBE program. Before the Supreme Court,
United States Solicitor General Theodore Olson defended the Clinton administration's "mend it, don't end it" policy on affirmative action. 409 However, the government's position was based on the newly4 1°
implemented regulations regarding race-conscious relief.
In oral argument before the Supreme Court, Solicitor General
Olson argued that petitioner, who had since been certified as a DBE,
41 1
had not lost a single contract because of the federal programs.
Moreover, he asserted, the revised race-conscious program at issue was
no longer in use in Colorado. 4 12 Olson argued that the benefits of the
new program could only be realized by those DBEs who could show
41
that they had actually been victims of prejudice or bias in the past. 8

He explained that, under this new program, business owners seeking
certification as DBEs were now required to submit signed and notarized statements acknowledging that they were socially and economically disadvantaged. 4 14 In addition, DBEs had to disclose their DBE
4 15
owner's personal net worth under the program's requirements.
408.
Ill]).

Id. (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 238( 1995) [Adarand

409. See David Savage, Unlikely Backer of Affirmative Action Emerges; Race: ConservativeSolicitor GeneralDefends Clinton-Era Policy, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2001, at A26.
410. See id.
411. See Savage, supra note 409, at A26.
412. See id.
413. See id.
414. See id.
415. See 49 C.F.R. § 26.67(a) (2001). A group of social science and comparative law
scholars argued that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals made a critical error in its interpretation of the regulations applicable to the affirmative actions issue in the Adarand case.
These scholars maintain that the presumption of economic disadvantage remains in place
with only one modification-the presumption is conclusively rebutted if a business owner's
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Thus, the program's new design served to benefit only those businesses that had actually and personally been negatively impacted by
discrimination.
Despite Olson's arguments, the Court failed to address the merits
of the new regulations of the 1998-amended federal DBE program.
The government argued that petitioner Adarand lacked standing to
challenge the particular regulations before the Court.4 16 The DBE

program before the Court and referenced in the Court's agenda regarding its grant of certiorari pertained to federally-assisted state and
local contracts which had been drafted under the DOT regulations.
The particular claim Adarand had raised in its brief before the Supreme Court, however, addressed direct federal procurement programs, which had been based on a presumption of social and
economic disadvantage based on race and gender. 41 7 This difference
in focus was viewed by the court and the government as an important
deviation from what the Court had been prepared to address in accordance with its granting of certiorari. 418 Moreover, the Tenth Circuit

had not addressed the constitutionality of the direct federal procure49
ment program, which Adarand had been challenging. 1
As a result of this conflict, much of the oral argument was subsequently dedicated to the resolution of the procedural issue of standing. What had been labeled as a blockbuster affirmative action case
had become bogged down by procedural issues. The Supreme Court
had been faced with an opportunity to resolve an issue of national
importance-whether the federal government's showing of discrimination was sufficient to meet strict scrutiny to justify its new and allegedly more narrowly-tailored race and gender-based, and race-neutral
program. However, the Court, exercising its judicial restraint, unanipersonal net worth "exceeds $750,000," thus, the $750,000 cap keeps a presumption of
disadvantage below the threshold. Regulations for DBE programs continue to presume
that members of the designated minority group are economically disadvantaged. See Clark
D. Cunningham, Should the Government Confess Errorin Adarand Constructors?, at http://law.
wustl.edu/equality/AD-ERROR.html (Sept. 14, 2001).
416. See Savage, supra note 409.
417. Under the TEA-21, Pub. L. No. 105-178 § 1101(b)(1), 112 stat. 107 (1998), Congress required that states expend no less than ten percent of federal highway funds on
DBE provided services. It incorporated the SBA's definition of disadvantaged businesspersons. Federal regulations required that recipient's receipt of federal monies be conditioned on establishing state DBE programs.
418. See generallyAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (200 1) (dismissing
certiorari as improvidently granted).
419. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147, 1160 (10th Cir. 2000)
[Adarand VII]. The court of appeals noted that Adarand lacked standing and had waived
his rights to challenge any other race-based program.
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mously dismissed the writ of certiorari as "improvidently granted," declining to review both the standing issues and the constitutional
challenge to the federal procurement program. 420 Thus, Adarand,
once again, left unresolved the question of how the federal government can meet the requirements of strict scrutiny under the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause and left in doubt the validity of federal
42 1
DBE programs in other jurisdictions.
One of the central issues left unresolved was whether Congress'
findings regarding the existence of discrimination were substantial
enough to withstand strict scrutiny. The court of appeals did not address the issue of the extent to which Congress has the authority to
redress discrimination under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore, the question remained as to the type and amount
of evidence necessary for the federal government's DBE programs to
be able to meet strict scrutiny where Congress is the fact-finder. Some
Justices and judges have observed that more deference is afforded to
Congress, as compared to state legislatures, in its fact-finding process
and that the nature of the evidence necessary to justify strict scrutiny
has depended on the governmental actor initiating the MBE program. 422 Is the nature of evidence required under Adarand, to justify

race-based relief initiated by Congress, different from the evidence required from state and local governments under Croson's strict scrutiny
standard?
In Adarand VII, the court of appeals cited congressional references to numerous local disparity studies to support factual predicates. 423 However, when the same studies were reviewed by lower
courts, the courts were highly critical of Croson and the lack of guidance that case provided to them.

424

Recent challenges to federal

DBE programs are illustrative of the divergent approaches courts have
420. See Adarand,534 U.S. at 105. The Court noted that petitioner had raised the standing issue only three weeks before oral argument and only in its reply brief. See id. at 109.
421. See Clark D. Cunningham, Glenn C. Lowry & John David Skrentny, PassingStrict
Scrutiny: Using Social Science To Design Affirmative Action Programs, 90 GEo. L.J. 835, 850
(2002).
422. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 478 (1989). Justice
O'Connor wrote, "Congress, unlike any State or political subdivision, has a specific constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment. The power to
'enforce' may at times also include the power to define situations which Congress determines threaten principles of equality and to adopt prophylactic rules to deal with those
situations."
423.
424.

See Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1172-74.
See id.
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used to review the sufficiency of evidence offered to establish evidence
of discrimination.

42 5

In Sherbrooke Turf, plaintiff landscaping corporation, which was
owned by Caucasian males, challenged the federal DBE program administered by the state of Minnesota under the TEA-21, claiming that
it was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. 42 6 More
particularly, Sherbrooke claimed that the Adarand VII court's review
of the congressional findings related to the passage of the TEA-21 was
"insufficiently rigorous and less demanding than that required by
strict scrutiny. ' 427 Sherbrooke claimed that the Supreme Court's deci-

sion in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents428 mandated an independent
judicial assessment of congressional findings that pertained to discrimination. 429 The district court disagreed, noting that, while the Su-

preme Court had required that courts take a closer look at Congress'
findings with the intent of determining the extent to which a federal
program seemed to be piercing a state's sovereign immunity, such a
meticulous search was not required under the Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement powers. 430 The district court cited City of Boerne v.
Flores43 1 and Kimel, where the Supreme Court had decided that congressional findings are entitled to greater deference than local or state
findings under the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 32
Additionally, plaintiff had requested that the court review every
document considered by Congress, when Congress made its decision
that a DBE program should be created, in order for the court to be
able to independently determine the validity and worthiness of defendant's alleged compelling interest. The district court considered this
request to be "fatally flawed. '43 3 The court stated, "This court has no
reason to suspect or doubt either the Tenth Circuit's or Congress's
425. See Cunningham, supra note 421. There have been a number of post-Adarand challenges to federal transportation and defense programs that employ race-based disadvantaged business plans. See generally Klaver Constr. Co. v. Kan Dep't of Transp., 211 F. Supp.
2d 1296 (D. Kan. 2001); Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U. S.. Dep't of Def., 262 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir.
2001); Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. Dep't of Transp., No. 00-CV-1026, 2001 WL 1502841
(D. Minn. 2001); Gross Seed v. Neb. Dep't of Transp., No. 4:00-CV-3073 (D. Neb. May 6,
2002).
426. See Sherbrooke Turf 2001 WL 1502841, at *1.
427.

See id. at *6.

428.

528 U.S. 62 (2000).

429.
430.

See Sherbrooke Turf 2001 WL 1502841, at *6.
See id.

431.
432.

521 U.S. 507 (1997).
See id. (citing Boerne, 521 U.S. at 636; citing also Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81).

433.

See Sherbrooke Turf 2001 WL 1502841, at *6.
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ability to ascertain and understand evidence related to the need for
'434
affirmative action in federal highway construction programs.
The district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that Congress had a sufficient evidentiary basis upon
which it could conclude that racism and discrimination in the highway subcontracting industry warranted the implementation of a raceconscious program. 43

5

While acknowledging that states and local af-

firmative action programs must demonstrate a strong basis in evidence of discrimination, the court stated, "TEA-21 is not ... a state or
locally based program. It was enacted by a Congress which made appropriate findings ....

When Congress establishes a constitutionally

valid nationwide program, the federal courts afford greater deference
4 36
to its national policy decisions."

The court also found that the new TEA-21 program did not burden non-minority contractors because the "program was now narrowly
tailored, in that it utilized an economic, rather than race-based stan43 7
dard to determine which businesses were actually disadvantaged.
Although non-DBEs would invariably bear some burden, the court
found that the government had established a sufficient link between
the DBE program and the discrimination the program was designed
43 81
to counter to justify remedial action.
A contrary view to the way in which Congress should be required
to make a showing of discrimination was expressed by a federal district court in Rothe Development Corporationv. United States Department of
Defense (Rothe Development 1).49 This case involved a challenge to another federal government-initiated DBE, which was enacted under the
Department of Defense ("DOD").440 In Rothe Development I, an unsuccessful bidder challenged the DOD's program-Section 1207 of the
National Defense Authorization Act of 1987-under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, contending that the government lacked the necessary evidentiary support to justify its racebased relief program. 44 1 The district court, using a fairly deferential
434. Id.
435. See id. at *6, "11.
436. Id. at *11.
437. See id. at *8.
438. See id. The Court noted that the new regulations, importantly, incorporated raceneutral elements into the DBE program, requiring contractors to use race-neutral means
over race-based means when possible. See id. at *2 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 26.51 (a) (2000)).
439. 49 F. Supp. 2d 937 (W.D. Tex. 1999) [hereinafter Rothe Dev. I].
440. See id. at 941.
441. See id. at 945. The section 1207 program set a statutory goal of five percent participation by DBEs in DOD programs. See 10 U.S.C. § 2323(a)(1) (2000).
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strict scrutiny test, found that the program, which had employed a
race-based evaluation system that served to benefit socially and eco442
nomically disadvantaged bidders, was constitutional.
At issue was the government's use of a price-evaluation system
that would increase the dollar amount of the bids of non-SDB bidders
by as much as ten percent, so that a federal goal of awarding five percent of defense contracts to SDBs could be achieved. 4 3 The government argued that Congress had sufficient evidence upon which it
could be concluded that the DOD had at least been "a passive participant" in the past, private discriminatory conduct that had been carried out against minorities, preventing them from obtaining defense
contracts. 444 The government also argued that post-enactment evidence, which had been compiled subsequent to the adoption of its
44 5
1992 program, supported the program's constitutionality.
In evaluating the program under strict scrutiny, the district court
employed a deferential standard of review to the congressional-based
action. 44 6 The district court pointed out that some of the Justices who
had sided with the plurality in Croson and Fullilove had indicated that
since, in those cases, Congress had employed broader remedial powers than other governmental bodies had employed, congressional
findings would be entitled to greater deference than that typically afforded to state or local bodies. 447 Following the reasoning laid out in
those cases, the court in Rothe upheld the constitutionality of the gov448
ernment's program.
The court of appeals, in Rothe Development II, disagreed with the
lower court, finding that Croson provided no basis upon which courts
could apply a watered-down version of strict scrutiny, which ap442. Rothe Dev. 1, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 954.
443. See id. at 942.
444. See id. at 950.
445. See id.
446. See id. at 945. While the Fourteenth Amendment limits state action, it also constitutes a grant of federal power to remedy prior discrimination. See id. at 942. Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment expressly authorizes Congress "to enforce by appropriate legislation, the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment." The term "enforce" has been interpreted to have a remedial meaning, as opposed to an authority to substantively relieve. See,
e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80 (2000).
447. See Rothe Dev. I at 943-44, 950. The district court stated that Adarand III had left
undisturbed the various Justices' previously-expressed views on Congress' broad remedial
powers. See id. at 944. Since no Justice had repudiated those views, the district court concluded that "a majority of the Court would favor some standard that allowed Congress a
broader brush than it would allow states with which to design remedial measures for the
purpose of addressing nationwide discrimination." Id. at 944.
448. See id. at 954.
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proached a type of mid-level scrutiny, regarding congressional programs. 4 49 The court of appeals noted that while the district court was

correct with respect to using deferential review regarding Congress'
Section Five powers, it had not correctly identified the issue before
the court because section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization
Act was enacted pursuant to Congress' Article I powers. 450 The court
stated that the section 1207 program was enacted pursuant to Article
1, as set forth in Adarand 111.451 Accordingly, the court determined
that Congress was not entitled to deference regarding a court's determination of whether Congress had a compelling interest in enacting a
452
race-based program.
Interestingly, in remanding the case to the district court, the
court of appeals stated in a footnote that the fact that Congress is not
entitled to deference in its enacting of race-based relief does not
mean that Congress is not entitled to deference regarding the validity
of the evidence it has uncovered in its fact-finding process. 45- The appeals court noted that the fact-finding process of legislative bodies is
entitled to a presumption of regularity and deferential review by the
judiciary. 45 4 Thus, congressional hearings and testimony would presumably not be subject to the kind of de novo review of fact-finding
undertaken by some federal courts in reviewing evidence of state and
local governments.
The court of appeals next addressed the question of whether the
government's use of post-enactment evidence, to support the asserted
compelling interest of remedying discrimination as a basis for its enacting social classification programs, was legitimate. 455 The court analyzed the district court's reliance on the federal government's 1998
benchmark study, as well as evidence from a brief from the Asian
American Legal Defense and Education Fund, to support the district
449. See Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 262 F.3d 1306, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
[hereinafter Rothe Dev. I].
450. See id. Congress' powers under Article I are more limited than under Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under Article I, Congress is given power to appropriate
funds for the armed forces.
451. See id.
452. See id. The court noted, that the section 1207 program, like the program in
Adarand III, was enacted pursuant to Article I powers, meant that the Court "intended
there to be only one kind of strict scrutiny, applied with the same level of rigor to both
state/municipal racial classifications and federal racial classifications enacted under Congress' Article 1 power." Id. at 1319.
453. See id. at 1322 n.14.
454. See id. (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989)).
455. See Rothe Dev. II, F.3d at 1325.
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court's finding that the government had a compelling interest in rem456
edying discrimination in government contracting.
While the appeals court noted that circuit courts had allowed the
use of post-enactment evidence which was compiled before the re-authorization or re-enactment of race-based programs, it asserted that
"[t] he use of post-enactment evidence to justify the constitutionality
'457
of a program, as enacted, present[ed] a more difficult question.
The circuit court acknowledged that other circuits were split regarding the propriety of the use of post-enactment evidence to demonstrate that a strong basis in evidence of discrimination existed before
458
race-based programs had been enacted.
The court of appeals examined the "strong basis in evidence" language of Wygant and Croson, and acknowledged that some courts have
held that the evidentiary burden required of a legislature, regarding
its fact-finding process, is substantially less than the standard of review
459
required of the legislature when its program is challenged in court.
However, the court of appeals felt that more recent Supreme Court
cases had concluded that there was no difference regarding the strong
basis in evidence standard, whether the standard was being applied
during litigation or to legislative fact-finding that had been conducted
before the government had enacted a race-based classification program. 46°1 The court relied on the Supreme Court's rulings in Shaw v.
Hunt461 and Bush v. Vera. 462 In both voting rights cases, the Supreme

Court held that redistricting plans must be based on a strong basis in
463
evidence before Congress can take race-based remedial action.
Based on this precedent, the court of appeals in Rothe concluded
that if the pre-reauthorization evidence offered by the government is
insufficient to maintain a program when the program is challenged
456. See id. at 1324-25.
457. Id. at 1325.
458. See id. at 1326.
459. See id.
460. See id.
461. 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
462. 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
463. See Rothe Dev. II, 262 F.3d at 1326-27. In a footnote, the court of appeals pointed
out that although Shaw was a racial gerrymandering case, the Supreme Court's traditional
practice allows forJustices to rely on the precedents set in factual situations other than the
present one, such as employment or education in this instance, where racial classifications
are employed. See id. at 1327 n.19. In accordance with this Supreme Court practice, the
author believes that other precedents should be explored in order to establish a suitable
framework for courts to follow when they are dealing with federal race-based programs. See
discussion infra Part III.
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on constitutional grounds, then the program must be invalidated, regardless of the strength of the post-reauthorization evidence offered. 4 64 In other words, there must be sufficient pre-enactment
evidence to support a program to create a "strong basis in evidence. '4 65 The court did recognize that a "governmental body . ..
reauthorizing ...

a statute ...

has the opportunity to inspect all evi-

4 66
dence post-dating enactment but pre-dating reauthorization.
"Therefore," the court maintained, "in assessing the constitutionality
of a statute in an equal protection context, a reviewing court should
be able to consider all evidence available to Congress pre-dating the
46 7
most recent reauthorization of the statute at issue."
In applying the "strong basis in evidence" standard, the court
found that the district court had engaged in only a cursory analysis of
the evidence that had been before Congress at the time the section

1207 program

had been reauthorized. 4 618

The court of appeals

pointed out that the lower court had merely listed all the reports and
materials that Congress had considered before it had enacted its program. 469 Noting that Croson requires that remedies be enacted only to
rectify identified systemic discrimination, the court found that the
preauthorization evidence relied on by the district court to reach its
holding was insufficient to show systemic discrimination against
Asian-Americans, which was a minority group the program was de470
signed to assist.
The court of appeals also criticized the district court's lack of reliance on statistical evidence tojustify its remedial program, noting that
"nearly every court of appeals upholding the constitutionality of a
race-based classification has relied in whole or in part on statistical
evidence. '4 71 According to the court, the only statistical preauthorization evidence offered by Congress, and relied upon by the lower
court, had been a "statement in a 1975 House report that 'only three
percent of American businesses were owned by minorities, while mi472
In conclunorities made up sixteen percent of [the] population.' ,,

sion, the court further held that the district court had impermissibly
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.

See Rothe Dev. II, 262 F.3d at 1327-28.
See id.
Id. at 1322 n.15.
Id.
See id. at 1322.
See id.
See id. at 1323.
Id. at 1323-24.
Id. at 1324 (citation omitted).
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used post-enactment evidence to justify the reauthorization of Con473
gress' section 1207 program.

The court of appeals remanded the case to the district court, instructing it to engage in a "non-deferential analysis that applies to
state or municipal racial classification. ''474 The court gave specific gui-

dance to the district court, ordering it to not only make findings as to
whether the section 1207 program was actually remedial in nature,
but also to determine whether the remedy it alleged to provide was
actually aimed at countering present discrimination or the lingering
effects of discrimination. 475 The court further instructed that if it was
a case revolving around a showing a past discriminatory effects, then
the district court was to make an independent assessment as to
whether the evidence was still probative, i.e., "whether the effects of
past discrimination [had] attenuated over time, or .

.

. whether the

lingering effects [were] still present or were present in 1998 when the
1207 program was applied.

'476

Moreover, as to the narrow tailoring element of strict scrutiny,
the appeals court reviewed the district court's exclusive reliance on
the government's Benchmark Study in assessing whether the government's five percent goal was sufficiently proportional to the discrimination the program was allegedly designed to address. 477 Since the
Benchmark Study had been conducted after the 1992 reauthorization
of the program, the court of appeals asserted that the study was not
relevant to a determination of the proper goals for the program when
47
it was reauthorized in 1992. 1

The court further instructed the district court to determine
whether the section 1207 program was over-inclusive with regards to
whether each of the five minority groups included within the 1207
program had actually suffered from the lingering effects of discrimination. 479 The court noted that the 1207 program had included a pre-

sumption of social and economic. 48t 1 The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held that for the program to be "narrowly tailored,"
473. See id. at 1324.
474. Id. at 1329.
475. See id.
476. Id.
477. See id. at 1331.
478. See id. at 1331-32.
479. See id. at 1332. The groups presumed to be disadvantaged under the section 1207
program were Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Americans,
and Subcontinent Asian Americans. See id. at 1314 n.4.
480. See id. at 1332.
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Congress had to submit sufficient evidence to show that it had made
an individualized showing of disadvantage, with regards to the groups
of people that were alleged to have been disadvantaged and so would
481
properly benefit from the program.
A case that involved a program similar to the challenged TEA-21
48 2
program was Gross Seed v. Nebraska Department of Transportation.
Plaintiff Gross Seed Company filed suit against the Nebraska Department of Roads ("NDOR"), challenging the constitutionality of
NDOR's program. 4 83 The DOT and FHWA were subsequently named
as defendants. 484 NDOR operated a program pursuant to 49 C.F.R.,
section 26.1, which governs the participation of DBEs in DOT financial assistance programs. 4 85 The federal government intervened in the
case, urging the district court to apply the analysis used, and to adopt
the same conclusions reached by the Tenth Circuit in Adarand VII,
where the court had upheld the federal government's race-conscious
486
program.
In Gross Seed, the government reminded the court that a "bipartisan majority of Congress had explicitly recognized [that the TEA-21
was] necessary to remedy discrimination in construction. '4 7 Using evidence similar to the evidence it had presented in Adarand, the government contended that Congress had several bases upon which it
had determined that discrimination had hindered the ability of mi48
norities and women to compete in the construction marketplace.
The Urban Institute Study served to provide the factual predicate
upon which Congress had enacted its program. 48 9 The study
presented various statistics gathered from local disparity studies, and
found "statistical underutilization of Black, Hispanic, Asian and Native
American owned companies." 490 Finally, the government argued that
other federal courts, which had considered the constitutionality of
481. See id. New government regulations established in 2000 showed the need for an
individualized showing of economic disadvantage for each minority included within a racebased program. 13 C.F.R. § 124.1002(a) (2002).
482. Gross Seed v. Neb. Dep't of Transp., No. 4:00-CV-3073 (D. Neb. May 6, 2002).
483. See id.
484. See id.
485. 49 C.F.R. § 26.1 (2000).
486. See Brief of the Government Intervenor, Gross Seed (No. 4:00-CV-3073).
487. See id.
488. See id.
489. See id.
490. See id.
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federal race-based programs, had found such programs to be sup49 1
ported by a compelling interest.
The district court was convinced by the government's evidence,
which it had used to establish a compelling governmental interest. 492
Accordingly, the district court Upheld the federal program. 493 The
court referred to the lower court decisions of Sherbrooke and Rothe,
where those courts had recognized that congressional fact-finding
should be afforded leeway regarding its function as a tool for establishing a factual predicate to support Congress' compelling interest
claim, regarding race-based remedies. 49 4 Those courts realized that

Congress is not an amalgam of state and local governments, but that it
must independently engage in national fact-finding in order to establish a single national policy.49 5 Even the appeals court in Rothe had
recognized that Congress is entitled to a presumption of regularity
regarding the facts it uncovers in its fact-finding process, even when
the facts at issue are the same or similar to those that had been relied
upon by state and local governments, which had not been afforded
49 6
deference.
Some district courts have accepted the government's compelling
interest evidence as supportive of a legitimate factual predicate. Some
commentators and plaintiffs, however, have criticized Congress' reliance on evidence derived from local disparity studies. 497 The Adarand
V!I court, not agreeing with these commentators and plaintiffs, and in
part relying on the government's Urban Institute Study, found that
the government had established a strong basis in evidence of remediable discrimination as a "matter of law." 49 8 Findings of private national
discrimination hindering fair competition between minority and nonminority enterprises, regarding contractors' ability to obtain bonding
and supplies and to access accurate business networks, have been
found to exist at the local levels at levels comparable to those at the
national level. 499 Additionally, congressional citations to local dispar491. The government cited to Sherbrooke, Rothe I and Adarand VII. See Gross Seed (No.
4:00-CV-3073).
492. See id.
493. See id.
494. See id.
495. See id.
496. See Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 262 F.3d 1306, 1322 n.14 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
497. See discussion supra note 106.
498. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147, 1175 (10th Cir. 2000)

[Adarand VII].
499.

See id.
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ity studies in Louisiana and Atlanta and anecdotal evidence were relied upon in helping to establish the congressional factual
predicate. 500 Yet, the same evidence was given little weight when evaluated by the lower courts. The Supreme Court's dismissal of certiorari
in Adarand III prevented the Court from making a definitive holding
regarding the necessary factual predicate for Congress to have to establish regarding its use of race-based programs.
III.

Dealing with an Imprecise Framework

Unlike the federal government, state and local jurisdictions have
found it difficult to establish a strong basis in evidence of discrimination sufficient to meet the strict scrutiny standard of Croson. In large
measure, this represents the difficulties of proving discrimination
under the Court's equal protection jurisprudence of proving discriminatory intent. Although discrimination in the business context is
proven in the same way as any other form of discrimination, through
direct and circumstantial evidence and by rational inference-drawing,
the existence of discrimination in the business context is more difficult to uncover. In the business context, absent evidence of contractors' outright refusal to accept bids from minority vendors because of
race or sex, courts must focus on whether more subtle forms of discrimination take place, such as contractors' acceptance of high bids
50 1
from non-minority-owned firms.
The Supreme Court has allowed various types of proof to be introduced in jurisdictions' attempts to show the existence of intentional race and gender discrimination. It has considered evidence of
discrimination in areas such as employment, housing and voting
rights. 5 0

2

In The Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Cor-

poration,50 3

the issue before the Supreme Court had to do with
whether proof of discriminatory intent was sufficient to show that the
Equal Protection Clause had been violated, where the case involved a
challenge to a racially-grounded zoning ordinance.50 4 The Court set
500. See id. at 1172.
501. See, e.g., Builders Ass'n of Greater Chi. v. Cook County, 123 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1114
(N.D. IIl. 2000). "[T] here [was] virtually no evidence that any general contractor... [had]
hired a non-M/WBE subcontractor on a private project that was less qualified or higher
priced than an available M/WBE subcontractor would have been."
502. See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court
Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 283 (1977).
503. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
504. See id. at 254-65. In Village of Arlington Heights, plaintiff housing developer filed a
lawsuit, alleging that the Village's decision not to rezone an area for multiple family dwell-
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forth a number of factors that could be reviewed to uncover discriminatory animus, such as "[t]he historical background of the decision
[to zone or not rezone,] [t]he specific sequence of events leading up
to the challenged decisions ....

[d]epartures from the normal proce-

dural sequence[, and] [t]he legislative or administrative history [behind the decision to zone or not rezone]."5115 These factors, the Court

determined, could give rise to circumstantial evidence of the existence of intentional discrimination.5 ° 6 The Court also noted that evidence of a stark pattern of denial of certain rights or privileges to only
particular groups of people, which was the type of evidence relied
upon in earlier Supreme Court cases involving racial gerrymandering
and zoning, might serve as a jurisdiction's proof of discriminatory
50 7

intent.

The Supreme Court has also developed a model for showing disparate treatment in the 'employment context. In this context, the
Court has developed various means of establishing a prime facie case
of discrimination based on circumstantial evidence. Sufficient evidence may exist where there is proof that the person that had allegedly been discriminated against was a member of a protected class and
was qualified for a particular position, yet was denied access to the
position. 50

Additionally, there must be no evidence of any non-racial

reason for the employment decision to keep the applicant from obing was based on race, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 557-58. Plaintiff proceeded on both disparate treatment and disparate effects theories. See id. at 269.
Based on the Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Davis, the Court asserted that
proof of discriminatory intent was required in order to show that a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause had occurred. See id. at 264-65 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
242 (1976)). The likely result of the Village's rezoning of the property at issue for multifamily use would have been an increase in the African-American presence in Arlington
Heights. See Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 255.
505. Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267-68.
506. See id.
507. See id. at 564.
508. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also Tex.
Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981); Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575 (1978). See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971) (upholding the use of the disparate impact test under Title VII). But see Tristin K.
Green, Making Sense of the McDonnell Douglas Framevork: CircumstantialEvidence and Proofof
DisparateTreatment Under Title VII, 87 CAL. L. REv. 983 (1999) (discussing the criticisms of
the McDonnell employment model). Although the McDonnell DouglasCourt laid out a general burden-shifting framework for cases in which the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence of discrimination, it did little to explain how future courts should apply this
framework. The Court did not explain, for example, whether the defendant's burden to
provide a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to deny the plaintiff employment was one of production or of persuasion. See id. at 987.
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taining the position he or she sought.5 09 Voluntary affirmative action
programs in employment have been upheld, so long as they have not
interfered with the interests of other employees, were limited in scope
510
to correct an imbalance in employee make-up, and were temporary.
Finally, in the voting rights context, the Court has also adopted a
model of proof regarding discrimination. In City of Mobile, Alabama v.
Bolden,5 1 ' the Supreme Court declared that proof of discriminatory
intent on the part of the jurisdiction that designed the voting plan at
issue was necessary to invalidate an at-large voting scheme on the basis
that the jurisdiction had discriminated against black voters in the electoral process. 51 2 In that case, the Court rejected plaintiffs offered circumstantial evidence of the existence of systematic discrimination in
5 13
the City of Mobile.
However, in a subsequent case, Rogers v. Lodge, 51 4 the Court invalidated a county's electoral scheme, based on plaintiffs circumstantial
evidence regarding the existence of discrimination that affected the
voting system in Burke County, Georgia.5 15 The Court in Rogers paid
particular attention to the evidence that set forth the history of dis51 6
crimination affecting blacks in the county in the electoral system.
The Court noted that discrimination prior to the passage of the Civil
Rights Act, particularly, had suppressed black voter registration and
participation in the electoral system.5 1 7 Moreover, the Court relied on
the fact that no black had ever been elected for County Commissioner, despite the fact that blacks had run for the position, and despite the very large percentage (38%) of black voters in Burke
County.51 8 The Court in Rogers also looked at the other social factors
affecting blacks in the County, such as disproportionate paving of
streets and roads in the black community, as compared to the large
amount of public works projects initiated in the white community,
and lack of suitable plumbing in black homes, both of which demon519
strated the existence of discriminatory conditions.
509. See Green, 411 U.S. at 802.
510. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
511. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
512. See id. at 66. The history of discrimination in Mobile and in Alabama, in general,
was an important factor to the lower court. See id. at 74.
513. See id. at 70.
514. 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
515. See id. at 622-24.
516. See id. at 624-25.
517. See id. at 625.
518. See id. at 623-24.
519. See id. at 626.
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Congress later amended the Voting Rights Act. 5 2°1 The amended

act did not include an intent standard regarding section two cases, but
nonetheless retained some of the factors for a court to consider regarding whether a sufficient showing of circumstantial evidence of discrimination had been demonstrated. 521 These factors, making up
what is known as the "totality of circumstances" test and set forth in
the Senate Judiciary Committee Majority Report accompanying the
bill that amended the Act, 5 22 include: the history of official discrimi-

nation affecting voting; the extent to which the particular state or subdivision is racially-polarized; whether voting procedures that serve to
enhance the opportunity for discrimination exist; whether minorities
have been excluded from the voting process, if one existed; and the
extent to which the effects of discrimination have hindered the ability
of minorities to participate in the political process. 523 The alleged
compelling interest of using race as a basis for drawing redistricting
lines to further minority-voting interests is also subject to Croson and
Adarand type strict scrutiny.
What is clearly lacking in the Croson and Adarand context, as compared to the above-mentioned contexts, is an evidentiary framework
for determining the weight of circumstantial evidence of discrimination in the public and private contracting markets. What evidence will
give rise to an inference of discrimination sufficient to establish the
"strong basis in evidence" standard in the Croson and Adarand context?
How can proof of the existence of discrimination be established after
a jurisdiction has developed a successful MWBE program, which has
enhanced the utilization rate of MWBEs? Will failure to solicit bids
from MWBEs, and subsequent failure to hire such firms, raise an inference of discriminatory motive, when the same firms are hired or
used only to satisfy MBE program demands?
In the midst of these unresolved questions, it is clear that courts
are refusing to view evidence of discrimination differently than in the
past, regarding legislative acts that are designed to remedy past discrimination. As commentator Michael Selmi has opined:
As a practical matter, the result is that the Court now sees unlawful
discrimination in the affirmative use of race, as occurs in the affirmative action cases or through racial redistricting, but is much
less likely to identify discrimination in cases in which African-Americans are the victims of subtle discrimination. Indeed, despite a
520.
521.
522.
523.

42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
See id. at §§ 1973(a), (b).
S. REP. No. 77-417, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07.
See id. at 28-29.
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broad consensus that discrimination today is generally perpetrated
through subtle rather than overt acts, the Court continually refuses
to adapt its vision to account for the changing nature of discrimination; as a result, it appears
unable to see discrimination that is
524
subtle rather than overt.
Selmi went on to say that the Court has not changed its way of
viewing the existence of discrimination since more blatant forms of
overt discrimination existed in the 1960s "when explicit barriers prevented African-Americans . . . from fully participating in social and
economic life." 525 Although employers no longer place "do not apply"
signs upon their doors, discrimination in the business marketplace
continues to flourish. Such discrimination involves stereotypical attitudes among contractors, closed networks of associates, and unequal
access to credit, loans, bonds, and insurance for MWBEs.
Discriminatory conditions such as outright denials of opportunities to bid or other "smoking gun" types of conditions will rarely exist
in the post-Crosoncases involving jurisdictions' attempts tojustify racebased remedial relief. However, few would argue that discrimination is
non-existent in the day-to-day contracting business. As Justice
O'Connor, writing for the Court in Adarand III, stated, "The unhappy
persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate
reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in response to
it."526

Most local jurisdictions have been unable to support a factual
predicate that is based upon studies showing minority underutilization. This is largely due to challenges jurisdictions have faced regarding the validity of their statistical methodologies for determining
disparity amounts regarding minority underutilization in public sector
contracting. As various congressional findings have indicated, private
sector discrimination remains a present day reality for MWBEs. Remedying the discrimination that is perpetrated against these firms in the
private sector is a compelling state interest, at least according to a plu52 7
rality of the Court in Croson.
It has been argued that the government should be able to make
"but-for availability adjustments" to counteract the effects of private
discrimination against minority businesses. 52 Local jurisdictions
524.

Selmi, supra note 502, at 284.

525.
526.
527.
528.

Id.

U.S. at 237.
See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989).
See Ayers & Vars, supra note 12, at 1586.
Adarand 1, 515
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should be required to develop empirical data to document the underutilization of MWBEs in private sector contracting and should be
able to use statistical regression analyses to establish discriminatory
patterns, as courts have required jurisdictions to do in voting rights
cases. Jurisdictions' reliance on census data to show the respective private market share of MWBEs being utilized may be one method jurisdictions could use to establish discriminatory patterns. However, some
courts have disavowed this method because of its inability to accurately portray actual availability, with regards to the firms that actually
bid on contracts. Such empirical data will be difficult to prove when
some contractor associations and members withhold private job bidding data. Congressional findings of national discrimination based on
local evidence, should, however, be admissible, for the purpose of bolstering a factual predicate of discrimination in certain areas, such as
bonding, and access to capital and insurance.
One local jurisdiction, the City of Atlanta, recently developed an
equal business opportunity ("EBO") program, predicated largely on
evidence of private sector discrimination. 5 29 The program was
adopted in 2001, following the release of the results of a statistical
disparity study which found that "African Americans, Hispanic and female-owned businesses in the Atlanta Region suffer economic disadvantage relative to similarly situated white-male firms, as a result of
discrimination by race, gender and ethnicity. 53°1The study also found
that annual revenues for African-American, Hispanic, and femaleowned businesses for certain industry classifications were statistically
significantly lower than would be expected of such firms of a particular size and age. 53 1 The purpose of the program, according to its pol-

icy statement, was to "ensure that the City of Atlanta [was] not a
passive participant in ongoing private sector discrimination and to
'53 2
promote equal opportunity for all businesses in the Atlanta region.
The city adopted the program prior to the termination of its previous goal-based ordinance, which had been the subject of a federal
lawsuit challenging the program's constitutionality. 533 The cornerstone of the new program was the requirement that potential bidders
demonstrate that at least once during a two-year period they had uti529..

ATLANTA, GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES,

530.
531.

Id.
See id.

532.
533.

Id.
See id.

art. X, div. 12 (2003).
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lized MWBEs for subcontracts on private jobs. 53

4

If the potential bid-

der could not show such prior utilization, then it was required to
evince documented good faith outreach efforts to identify and contract with MWBEs as subcontractors or for supplies for projects under5 35
taken in the public or private sector.
The Atlanta EBO program was predicated on the Croson plurality
opinion, where Justice O'Connor had written that "if the city could
show that it had essentially become a 'passive participant' in a system
of racial exclusion practiced by elements of the local construction industry .. .the city could take affirmative steps to dismantle such a
5 36
system."

Federal courts of appeals have endorsed this approach, yet no
local jurisdiction has been able to demonstrate the requisite showing
of passive participation in discrimination in the private sector. The
district court in the Webster case found that defendant Fulton County
had not actively furthered or facilitated private sector discrimination
and that the city's expert had improperly relied upon general local
marketplace data, because. the data made no showing of a link be537
tween itself and private sector discrimination.
Likewise, in Builders Association, the district court found that defendant county had not established a factual predicate showing of pri5 38
vate sector discrimination sufficient to support its MWBE program.
The court found that general contractors' failure to solicit MWBEs
5 39
was not equivalent to a discriminatory denial of opportunity to bid.

The court subsequently found that there was no proof that general
contractors had engaged in a pattern of refusing to hire, or had failed
to consider hiring, MBE subcontractors. 540 The court also determined
that there were "legitimate explanations for [plaintiffs witnesses']
election not to solicit bids on private work from these M/WBE
subcontractors."

54

1

In Concrete Works, the City and County of Denver defended its program in part based on the alleged existence of private discrimination
in the Denver metropolitan statistical area's ("MSA") construction in534. See id.
535. See id.
536. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989).
537. See Webster v. Fulton County, Ga., 51 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1368-69 (N.D. Ga. 1999).
538. See Builders Ass'n of Greater Chicago v. Cook County, 123 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1116
(N.D. Ill.
2000).
539. See id. at 1113.
540. See id.
541. Id. at 1114.
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dustry. 542 There, the court found that the MWBE disparity indices for
the Denver MSA, which combined evidence of public and private sector underutilization of MWBEs, gave rise to an inference of racial and
gender discrimination perpetrated by local prime contractors. 5 43 The
court of appeals held, however, that the Denver data did not show any
exact linkage between the way in which Denver awarded its public
contracts and Denver's MSA evidence of industry-wide discrimination. 544 While the court of appeals did not read Croson as requiring an

exact linkage between the way in which Denver decided to award its
public contracts to MWBEs and the specific private discrimination
sought to be remedied, it noted that Croson had determined that
"such evidence would at least enhance the municipality's factual predicate for a race- and gender-conscious program.

'545

The record in

Concrete Works, according to the appeals court, did not sufficiently explain Denver's role in the underutilization of MWBEs in the private
construction market. 54" The court, therefore, reversed summary judgment for Denver and remanded the case, with instruction to the lower
court to explore all the factual issues surrounding the issue of private
5 47
sector discrimination at trial..

On remand from the court of appeals, in Concrete Works III, the
district court found that the City of Denver had not presented a
strong basis in evidence sufficient to justify its MWBE program. 54 In
examining various disparity studies offered by the city, the court
found that defendant's evidence failed to satisfy six questions, which
the court had proposed as a litmus test to evaluate the evidence of
discrimination.5 49 The court further found that defendant had im542. See Concrete Works of Colo., Inc., v. City and County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513,
1523 (10th Cir. 1994).
543. See id. at 1529.
544. See id.
545. Id.
546. See id. at 1529-30.
547. See id. at 1531. Commentators Ayers and Vars noted that an "indirect causation"
rationale sets forth the theory that the "government has a compelling interest in ensuring
that public money does not directly cause private discrimination." See Ayers & Vars, supra
note 12, at 1601.
548. See Concrete Works of Colo. v. City & County of Denver, Colo., 86 F. Supp. 2d
1042, 1079 (D.Colo. 2000).
549. See id. at 1066. The following are three of the six questions:
(1) Is there pervasive race, ethnic and gender discrimination throughout all aspects of the construction and professional design industry in the six county Denver MSA? (2) Does such discrimination equally affect all the racial and ethnic
groups designated for preference by Denver and all women? (3) Does such discrimination result from policies and practices intentionally used by business firms
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properly used marketplace data, rather than evidence of underutiliza550
tion of MWBEs by the City and County of Denver itself.

On appeal, after the district court had invalidated Denver's program, the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court's reliance on the six questions was misplaced and improperly required
Denver to prove the existence of discrimination. 55 1 In response to the
district court's first question, as to whether there was pervasive race,
ethnic or gender discrimination throughout the construction and design industry in the Denver MSA, the appeals court stated, "Instead of
asking whether Denver had demonstrated strong evidence from which
an inference of past or present discrimination could be drawn, the
question asks whether Denver's evidence shows that there is pervasive
discrimination."5 52 The court in Concrete Works Vdetermined that this
55 3
improperly placed the burden of proof on the defendant.

The court also rejected the lower court's requirement that the
city demonstrate which firms in the private marketplace actively engaged in discrimination. 554 The court stated, "Denver's only burden
was to introduce evidence which raised the inference of discriminatory exclusion in the local construction market," linking its spending
to that discrimination; 555 this, the court asserted, could be established
through the use of statistical and anecdotal evidence of
discrimination.

55 6

Additionally, the court held that the district could erred in requiring Denver to show discriminatory motive on the part of private
construction firms.5

57

The court pointed out that imposing "such a

burden on a municipality would be tantamount to requiring direct
proof of discrimination and would eviscerate any reliance the municipality could place on statistical studies and anecdotal evidence. 5 -5

8

The court further rejected plaintiffs argument and the district court's
conclusion that evidence of private marketplace discrimination was irfor the purpose of disadvantaging those firms because of race, ethnicity and
gender?

Id.
550. See id. at 1067.
551. See Concrete Works of Colo. v. City & County of Denver, Colo., 321 F.3d 950, 970
(10th Cir. 2003).
552. Id. at 970.
553. See id.
554. See id. at 971.
555. See id.
556. See id.
557. See id.
558. Id. at 972.
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relevant.5 9 This was, according to the court, inconsistent with the
binding precedent that had been established in Adarand VII, where
5 6
the court held that private marketplace evidence was admissible. 11
On remand, the City of Denver introduced evidence from trial
that included testimony from MWBEs that the city had been a passive
participant in a system of racial exclusion practiced by local elements
of the industry.5 6' Although this evidence alone was insufficient to establish a strong basis in evidence, the appeals court concluded that
the anecdotal "evidence [linked] Denver's spending to private
discrimination.1562
Plaintiffs had criticized the city's reliance on studies that purported to show discrimination in lending and in business formation as
evidence of private marketplace discrimination.5 63 Again, the court rejected plaintiffs' criticisms, noting that circuit court precedent set in
Adarand VII allowed for the introduction of such evidence for purposes of demonstrating the existence of barriers to business formation
and competition among minority firms. 564 Evidence of barriers to
MWBE formation was found to be relevant because it showed that discrimination had hindered the ability of MWBEs to bid on public jobs
565
at the initial stages of the subcontracting process.
The court found that Denver's use of evidence of lending discrimination perpetrated by financial institutions supported evidence
of private marketplace discrimination, since such discrimination affected business formation down the road. 566 Moreover, the court concluded that evidence that consisted of lending and business formation
studies supported Denver's claim that M/WBEs were smaller and less
5 67
experienced because of marketplace and industry discrimination.
The district court had criticized the city's disparity studies for failing
568
to account for firm size and experience.
The Concrete Works case is one of very few cases that have sustained
a city's attempt to show linkage between the city's passive participation
559. Id.
560. See id.
561. See id. at 976.
562. See id. at 977.
563. See id. at 978.
564. See id.
565. See id. at 977.
566. See id.
567. See id.
568. See Concrete Works of Colo. v. City & County of Denver, Colo., 86 F. Supp. 2d
1042, 1057 (D. Colo. 2000) [Concrete Works III].
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in private marketplace discrimination and the ultimate finding that a
strong basis in evidence of discrimination exists. The appeals court
gave credence to the anecdotal evidence of discrimination the city
had used to supplement its marketplace data. 56 9 Moreover, the court
rejected wholesale attacks on the city's disparity studies, which had
treated the size and experience of MWBEs as race-neutral variables,
57 °
having the possible effect of explaining-away discrimination.
The exact required level of linkage between a showing of discrimination and private sector underutilization remains unclear. In Builders Association of Greater Chicago v. City of Chicago,5 71 the district court
declined to extend a local government's power to remedy private discrimination to situations where evidenced discrimination is presented
unconnected to the involved entity.5 72 Finding it difficult to draw a

line between passive discrimination by a jurisdiction and general societal discrimination, 573 the district court upheld a magistrate's decision
to quash a subpoena which sought information from building trade
unions regarding minority participation in apprenticeship programs. 574 Defendant City of Chicago had attempted to show evidence
of discriminatory exclusion of minorities in the building trade industry.57 5 The court noted that a local government could sanction a contractor for carrying out private discrimination against MBEs or could
adopt race-neutral programs to assist minority contractors who had
individually suffered from the effects of discrimination. 576 However,
the district court restricted local jurisdictions' use of general racebased remedies to "instances in which the local government has itself
discriminated or has been in some sense complicit in private
5 77
discrimination."

Conclusion
Counteracting the effects of discrimination against racial minorities, to justify a compelling interest in remedying such discrimination,
remains a constitutionally permissible objective under Croson and
Adarand. However, courts have not been given guidance regarding the
569.
570.
571.
572.
573.
574.
575.
576.
577.

See Concrete Works IV 321 F.3d 950 at 977.
See id.
240 F. Supp. 2d 796 (N.D. 11. 2002).
See id. at 798.
See id.
See id. at 799.
See id. at 797.
See id. at 799.
Id.
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level of proof of discrimination they must require from jurisdictions
for the courts to be able to evaluate constitutional challenges to
MWBE programs. The lower court decisions have been fatal to many
local and state governmental programs, but have been favorable to
many federal programs that have been backed by a showing of private
sector discrimination.
Although the Supreme Court was faced with an opportunity to
address the requisite showing of discrimination necessary to justify the
federal DBE program in the latest Adarand case, it has instead left the
waters so muddled that jurisdictions are asked to prove the unprovable-unless of course the discrimination at issue is so apparent that it
"walks like a duck." Using the strict scrutiny standard, the Supreme
Court has yet to uphold an affirmative action program that was supported by on a government's showing of the past effects of discrimination against racial minorities. 57 8 What is needed is a structural change
regarding the way in which discrimination is evaluated, regarding
public and private sector race-based remedies that set out to dismantle
race-constructed barriers.
MWBEs continue to face racial and gender discrimination, particularly in the private sector. MWBEs have been successful at securing
public sector contracts, at least when the jurisdictions in which they
do business employ race and gender-based remedies. Studies have
shown, however, that MWBE utilization dramatically decreases when
such remedies are not employed. Non-utilization of MWBEs does not
equate to discrimination, but jurisdictions should monitor private sector utilization, as the city of Atlanta does.
Jurisdictions should do more to document alleged discriminatory
practices. Judicial reliance on verifiable acts of discrimination to establish sufficient proof of discrimination is not required under Croson. As
the court of appeals stressed in Concrete Works III, all that is required is
a "stong basis in evidence."
Moreover, general marketplace data, reflecting both public and
private sector utilization of MWBEs should be admissible as probative
evidence. As the Supreme Court said in Croson, statistical evidence
may establish a pattern of discriminatory exclusion. 579 However, the
Court did not specify any particular type of statistical evidence, regarding how this pattern of discriminatory exclusion may be established. A
578. See, e.g., K.G. Jan Pillai, Neutrality of the Equal Protection Clause, 27 HASTiNGS CONST.
L.Q. 89, 96 (1999) ("Since the Adarand decision, the Clinton Administration has lost every
case in which it has sought the Supreme Court imprimatur of race conscious programs.").
579. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989).
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model which recognizes the proper role of statistical proof in discrimination cases, such as the models used in the voting and employment
contexts, should be employed in the business context. In the business
context, however, the model most include a requirement that jurisdictions consider which firms are ready, willing, and able to undertake
prime and subcontracting work. Moreover, variables that affect a
firm's capacity to be qualified, willing, and able to bid on public contracts must be taken into account, such as firm size, capacity, bonding,
and the like. The existence of relevant data, which reflects on the size
or experience of firms, and is the result of historical or present discriminatory practices, should be useful in establishing the strong basis
in evidence standard. Barriers to business formation or competition,
as described by the Tenth Circuit in Concrete Works III and Adarand VII,
are also probative of the existence of private marketplace
discrimination.
It is important for the Court to design a more structured framework for lower courts to abide by in assessing the constitutionality of
MWBEs. For even now, as we progress into the twenty-first century, it
is still difficult to remove what W.E.B. DuBois called the "Veil of
Race."
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